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ABSTRACT
The goal of this thesis project is to implement a low cost and small size triply
redundant fault-tolerant computer system. This three-processor system achieves 1-
Byzantine resilience, meaning that it is guaranteed to continue correct operation in the
presence of a single arbitrary fault. The most significant feature of this architecture is the
incorporation of an authentication scheme based on digital signatures into the inter-
processor communication protocols. This ability to authenticate messages enables
significant reductions in the amount of required hardware and in system complexity.
The first phase of implementation consisted of designing and building the
message passing and authentication protocols, based on the model of a public-key
cryptosystem. Once these protocols were established, an algorithm responsible for the
creation and periodic synchronization of virtual clocks on each of the processors was
integrated into the system. A voting scheme was then implemented which computes the
system output from the results of task execution on each of the three processors. Finally,
the overhead incurred by the achievement of fault-tolerance was measured, and expressed
in terms of the penalty enforced upon overall system throughput.
This computer system is intended for a wide range of applications in embedded
control requiring low power, weight, volume, and cost, where high reliability is also of
great importance.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
As time progresses, mission- and life-critical computer systems will demand ever
greater levels of reliability. Currently, failure probabilities ranging from 10-4 to 10-6 per
hour for mission-critical functions and 10- 6 to 10-'° per hour for vehicle-critical and
crew-safety functions are considered acceptable for these types of systems [HL91]. In
light of stricter reliability requirements, the classical process of failure-modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) has become unrealistic in terms of time and cost. Over the past fifteen
years, researchers have developed a new method of fault-tolerance certification of
computer systems. This new model allows for all possible types of faults, and any
computer system which meets the theoretical requirements is termed Byzantine resilient,
that is, capable of tolerating Byzantine faults. A Byzantine fault is any possible fault
within a computer system, spanning the entire range of severity up to and including
inconsistent or malicious behavior on the part of subsystems.
In the time since the creators of the field first defined the term Byzantine
resilience, many investigators have combined to publish a large amount of theoretical
work which establishes the hardware requirements for building a Byzantine resilient
system. One result of this research is that the requirements for systems which use
authentication (i.e., signing messages with unforgeable digital signatures) in inter-
processor communication are significantly less than the requirements for those systems
xwhich do not use authentication. However, there exists a penalty in the form of the extra
time required for each processor to sign every message it sends and to authenticate (i.e.,
determine the validity of the signature which accompanies) every message it receives.
Before embarking on the design of an authentication-based system, one must determine
whether or not this tradeoff makes sense in terms of overall system throughput. Using
the published theoretical constraints as a starting point, Anne Clark performed a study at
the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory which indicated the feasibility and advantages of
implementing a Byzantine resilient system using authentication [C194]. This study is the
impetus for actually realizing such a system, which is the focus of this thesis.
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1.2 Objectives
The objective of this project is to implement a triply redundant (i.e., composed of
three processors) Byzantine resilient computer system which incorporates digital
signatures into the inter-processor message passing protocols. We have named the
project "Beetle," reminiscent of the Volkswagen automobile, which was known for high
reliability and low cost. These qualities are goals for which the Beetle computer system
strives, particularly the characteristic of low cost. We intend for the Beetle to be usable
in a wide range of commercial applications, in contrast to the previous fault-tolerant
systems that Draper Laboratory has designed. These earlier systems were very
application-specific, and were expensive. With the Beetle, we aim to bring the cost of a
Draper fault-tolerant computer system down by a factor of 50 or 100 from prices in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars to prices in the thousands of dollars. We have met this
goal through the use of commodity processor boards, and by removing the need for
dedicated fault-tolerant hardware. Other goals for the Beetle system include transparency
of fault-tolerance, ease of reconfiguration for different processors, and the capability to
support industry-standard operating systems. Realization of these goals will depend on
the course of further development of the Beetle system beyond this writing. At the
present time we can mention that we have worked toward the latter two goals as much as
possible, primarily by implementing the fault-tolerance mechanisms in software. In
particular, we have attempted to make as much of the code involved processor- and
platform-independent, and to confine the hardware- and operating system-specific code to
modular, easy to modify sections.
During the process of designing and building a Byzantine resilient computer
system using message authentication, four key issues arise that must be resolved. First,
the designer must develop and implement an authentication system. Then, the
management of redundant hardware and the correct realization of Byzantine resilience
require implementing solutions to the problems of clock synchronization, voting, and
interactive consistency.
There are two major functions that the message authentication system must
provide to individual processors. The first is a method for generating a digital signature
for each message a processor creates and transmits. The second is a method for verifying
the correctness of each message a processor receives and processes. Section 4.1
describes the authentication system we developed for the Beetle prototype. This ability
to detect corrupted messages enables significant hardware reductions, as we explain in
Section 2.4.
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Fischer, et al., have shown that fault-tolerant systems are impossible to implement
asynchronously [FLP85]. Virtual clocks from each channel must therefore be
synchronized to within a known skew of each other. Section 4.2 thoroughly discusses the
issue of synchronization.
Voting is necessary to generate a consensus from the results of task execution on
the three channels, or processors. The Beetle uses this consensus for system output and
for fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR). We describe the voting process in
Section 4.3.
In almost every application, the system will read data from external sources. For
fault-tolerant purposes, it is critical that each processor use precisely the same values.
Execution of an interactive consistency exchange ensures that this information is bitwise
identical on all processors. We consider the problem of ensuring interactive consistency
in Section 4.4.
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the processing time on each channel could be spent on
synchronization, voting, and interactive consistency in a typical simple cyclic application.
Note that inter-processor communications, which are an integral part of all three of these
tasks, utilize authentication and do not appear in this figure.
Start of New
--Clo ck Frames
Sync IC Comp Vote IC Comp Vote 
T,-t_ 44.1 T--l_ al1:%. tl lJi t-
Sync: Vrtual Clock Synchronization
IC: Interactive Consistency Exchange
Comp: Fault-Tolerant Computation
Vote: Output Voting
Figure 1.1: Time Distribution of Processor Tasks.
We identified algorithms for dealing with the issues of synchronization
[HSSD83], voting [C194], and interactive consistency [C194]. Implementing digital
signatures required formulating the necessary message passing protocols, and then
implementing them as efficiently as possible. The authentication scheme used in this
architecture is a public-key cryptosystem. This enables each processor to verify
messages from each of the other processors. The work of this thesis consisted of
integrating the authentication protocol and the clock synchronization and voting
15
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algorithms into the Beetle system prototype, and the benchmarking of system
performance.
1.3 Approach
We assembled the overall system by completing a succession of smaller tasks.
The first step in implementing this system was to procure and set up the necessary
hardware. The foundation of the three redundant channels are three identical
commercially available microprocessor boards. We equipped each channel with
dedicated input and output devices for the purposes of development and debugging.
Once the separate channels were active, we established reliable communication links
between all three channels. Inter-channel communication occurs over serial lines, and
incorporates unique digital signatures for each channel. The next step consisted of
implementing the chosen clock synchronization algorithm. Following this we
synthesized the voting algorithm. At each stage, we took care to ensure the tight
integration of the new addition within the existing framework. We then evaluated the
performance of the various algorithms. We tabulate and discuss these results in Chapter
6.
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2. Fault-Tolerance Background
2.1 Fault-Tolerance Terminology
A good starting point for a discussion of fault-tolerance in computer systems is a
description of what faults are and how they occur. A computer system is composed of
multiple modules, each of which has a certain role. Any given module must operate in a
certain manner, which is usually classified in terms of providing certain outputs for
certain inputs. This is termed the specified behavior of the module. Any departure from
the specified behavior in the actual behavior of the module is designated a failure. The
cause of a failure is an uncompensated error, and such an error occurs due to afault.
The time delay between the occurrence of a failure and the detection of the failure is the
latency of the error. This chain of cause-and-effect can be best understood through an
example. Suppose there is a fluctuation in the power supply for a memory module.
Further, suppose that this fluctuation causes corruption of some of the data stored in the
memory module. The fluctuation is a fault, and the corrupted data is an error. When
another module accesses the erroneous data, a failure can occur. The time elapsed
between the power fluctuation and the data access is the latency of this error. The goal of
a fault-tolerant computer system is to mask or otherwise endure the effects of the power
supply fault, such that the observed behavior of the overall system does not deviate from
the expected behavior.
Figure 2.1 explains this terminology graphically. When the actual behavior of a
module matches its specified behavior, the module is in the service accomplishment state.
When a module fails, it moves into a state of service interruption. In this state, the
system moves through periods of fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR) [GS91].
Faults fall into three general categories: external faults, internal faults, and system
misuse. External faults include such problems as interference from electromagnetic
radiation, power source interruptions, temperature fluctuations, and physical abuse of the
system. Circuit failures and software bugs are examples of internal faults. The third
category concerns the correct usage of a system. Designers of computer systems work
with certain assumptions in mind concerning the application of their system. If the
operator of a system uses it for a purpose other than what the designer intended, under
unexpected conditions and in a unanticipated environment, system failure can result.
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T Latency
Fault
Figure 2.1: State Transitions in a Fault-Tolerant Computer System.
2.2 Draper Laboratory
Draper Laboratory has a long history of involvement in the design and
development of fault-tolerant computers. This history begins in the mid-1950's as Draper
researchers investigated the application of highly reliable computers to flight control,
guidance, and navigation. One early effort involved designing the Apollo Guidance
Computer in the 1960's, which NASA employed to safely control the lunar missions. A
significant accomplishment in the 1970's was the development of the flight control
computer for a Navy F-8 airplane being configured to fly-by-wire.
From the late 1970's through the 1980's, Draper and NASA expended
considerable effort in designing and building the Fault-Tolerant Multi-Processor (FTMP).
The FTMP architecture consisted of three sets of three processors and three redundant
memory modules connected to a system bus. The multi-layered redundancy of
computation was the central source of fault-tolerance in the FTMP. This machine greatly
improved Draper's knowledge and experience with several fault-tolerance design and
realization issues [HLS87].
The lessons Draper learned from the FTMP project led into the next major effort:
development of the Fault-Tolerant Processor (FTP) in the early 1980's. The biggest
change from the FTMP architecture to that of the FTP was the reduction in overall
throughput from that of up to four processors to that of a single processor. The FTP was
triply redundant like the FTMP, and this redundancy level could be varied due to the
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application of a particular FTP system. Two major projects for which Draper employed
the FTP architecture were the control computers for the Unmanned Undersea Vehicle
(UUV) and the Seawolf submarine.
Throughout the 1980's and into the 1990's, Draper has committed substantial
resources to developing a succession of Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processors (FTPPs).
These machines have successfully realized ultra-reliable parallel processing designs. The
next direction for Draper's efforts is toward the design of a more widely applicable fault-
tolerant computing system: the Beetle project.
2.3 Other Fault-Tolerant Systems
Several fault-tolerant computers have had an impact on the conceptualization of
the Beetle computer system. At roughly the same time that Draper designed the FTMP,
SRI International developed the Software-Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT)
computer. These two systems were devised in coincident time frames and with
coincident fault-tolerance goals, but with multiple differences in actual design.
The architects of the SIFT computer system implemented all executive functions,
or operating system functions, in software. They chose this approach due to their desire
to avoid faults caused by hardware failure. Another goal of the SIFT project was
transparency of fault-tolerance. The designers intended for the user to program the
system in the same manner as a simplex, or uni-processor, system yet have the benefit of
increased reliability. The redundant processors in the SIFT system were loosely
synchronized. Unfortunately, with these strict specifications and the limited hardware
capability and software tools available at the time, such an implementation of fault-
tolerance was far too taxing on system resources. In fact, in some cases, the overhead of
fault-tolerance consumed up to 80% of the overall processing time of the machine
[PB86].
The designers of the FTMP had different ideas about how to approach fault-
tolerance. They decided to use hardware implementation for some executive functions,
such as clock synchronization and voting. This reduced overhead, but required the
development of custom hardware. The different modules of the FTMP were tightly
synchronized, in contrast to the SIFT system [HSL78]. The result was a slightly more
efficient design, but one that was still not practical. The system overhead experienced in
the FTMP was roughly 30% of the available processing time [Lala86].
The Multicomputer Architecture for Fault-Tolerance (MAFT), developed at the
Allied Signal Corporation in the mid 1980's, followed both SIFT and FTMP
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chronologically. MAFT employed loose synchronization, and implemented executive
functions with specialized hardware called operations controllers. This computer was
capable of handling the control of tasks occurring up to 350 times per second [KWFT88].
By way of comparison, the SIFT architecture was only able to handle control loop
frequencies of about 30 cycles per second [PB86].
The SIFT project, in particular, had several then-groundbreaking goals in
common with the Beetle project. These included transparency of fault-tolerance to the
user and software implementation of fault-tolerance. Therefore, a major challenge for the
Beetle is to meet these goals without the severe performance overhead associated with the
SIFT operating system. A multi-step approach integrated into the design process enables
the Beetle to avoid such complications. First of all, the Beetle employs efficient
algorithms for the purposes of synchronization, voting, and interactive consistency.
These algorithms make minimal use of system resources to accomplish their duties.
Secondly, we measured and evaluated overhead at multiple stages of the development
process, in order to monitor system performance. In this way, we largely avoided
potential bottlenecks and inefficient implementations. Lastly, the Beetle is not
particularly intended for high throughput or highly time-critical applications. An
example of how this impacts the system architecture is that synchronization in the Beetle
may occur less often than in these previous systems, without jeopardizing the capability
to successfully perform the assigned tasks.
2.4 Byzantine Resilience
Ever since computer scientists first investigated fault-tolerant computing systems
in the 1950's, the need for the certification of these systems has existed. The classical
method developed and used for many years is termed failure-mode and effects analysis
(FMEA). This process involves determining the different possible modes of failure,
calculating the probability associated with each mode, and designing tolerance of the
most probable failures into the system. The reliability of the system then depends on the
likelihood of failure modes which are unaccounted for by the tolerance mechanisms. As
demands for failure rates decrease below 10-9 per hour [HL91], the requirements in time
and cost that an FMEA-based approach demand become ever more unrealistic. It became
generally apparent to the scientific community that a new basis for fault-tolerant
certification was necessary.
Aside from unrelenting consumption of resources, another problem with FMEA is
that it depends upon the correct prediction of all possible faults. If a fault situation is not
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foreseen by the system designers, it may not be tolerated. Almost all faults are, in fact,
predictable by competent investigators. The possibility still exists, however, for strange
and arbitrary faults to occur. Several documented cases of such arbitrary failures exist in
the literature. Investigators have traced at least one in-flight failure of a triplex digital
computer system to an apparently Byzantine fault and the lack of architectural safeguards
against such faults [MG78]. In circuit-switched network studies at Draper, designers
observed a failure mode in which a faulty node responded to commands addressed to any
node [HL91]. These instances underscore the need for a fault-tolerance certification
technique which accounts for arbitrary failures.
Out of these needs, three researchers developed the concept of Byzantine
resilience. The initial statement of this new approach comes from a paper by Lamport,
Shostak, and Pease [LSP82]:
Reliable computer systems must handle malfunctioning components that give
conflicting information to different parts of the system. This situation can be
expressed abstractly in terms of a group of generals of the Byzantine army
camped with their troops around an enemy city. Communicating only by
messenger, the generals must agree upon a common battle plan. However, one or
more of them may be traitors who will try to confuse the others. The problem is
to find an algorithm to ensure that the loyal generals will reach agreement.
The generals are the processors of the computer system, and the messengers are the
communication links between the processors. Note that a faulty processor is referred to
as traitorous; this indicates that Byzantine resilient systems can tolerate even intentionally
malevolent behavior on the part of faulty processors.
In the following years, others have added to and extended this theory, and several
papers have identified the specific hardware requirements to which Byzantine resilient
systems must adhere. A multi-processor system is designatedf-Byzantine resilient if it is
designed to handle f simultaneously active Byzantine faults. These theoretical
requirements are expressed in terms of f. Byzantine resilient systems can either use
authenticated message passing or not. Authenticated message passing utilizes
unforgeable digital signatures to remove the possibility of one processor forging or
altering messages from other processors. Table 2.1 outlines the hardware requirements
for both authenticated and unauthenticated message passing protocols. Examination of
this table reveals that implementing message passing with digital signatures certainly
results in hardware savings and in reduction of complexity.
The processor requirements for Byzantine resilient systems are such that more
than two-thirds of the processors must be operating correctly if authenticated protocols
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are not used. If the message passing incorporates digital signatures, then greater than half
of the processors must be non-faulty. This translates into a hardware savings of f
processors.
System Characteristic Unauthenticated Messages Authenticated Messages
Processors [LSP82] 3f+1 2f+ 1
Connectivity [Dol82] 2f+1 f+1
Communication Rounds [DS83] f+1 f+1
Table 2.1: Hardware Requirements forf-Byzantine Resilience.
Consider the distribution of single-source information amongst the processors of
the system. With unauthenticated communication, each processor needs 2f + 1 links,
since the only way of screening out corrupted or incorrect messages is by a majority vote.
If at most f messages can be incorrect, then the remaining f + 1 will be correct and be in
the majority. Using authenticated communication, however, the f corrupted messages
are easily identified, and the one message that does authenticate can be used. This results
in a connectivity requirement of f + 1 for systems using authenticated message passing.
A system using authentication protocols requires f fewer communication links than a
system with unauthenticated protocols.
When a processor wishes to communicate data to each of the other processors,
multiple rounds of message transmission are generally required. Each processor's actions
within a given round depend upon the information it received in the previous round. The
number of communication rounds required to accurately disseminate information does
not change with the implementation of an authenticated message passing protocol. The
number of rounds must be f + 1 in both the authenticated and non-authenticated cases.
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3. The Beetle
3.1 Descent from Previous Systems
The Beetle architecture differs fundamentally from systems previously developed
at Draper in several important ways. These earlier systems were high cost, highly
specialized systems. Some were designed for high throughput, and most were physically
large systems. The fault-tolerance of these systems, meaning tasks such as
synchronization and voting, was implemented through the use of specialized hardware.
All of these goals and characteristics are changed in the Beetle.
Draper has conceived of and designed the Beetle as a low cost, physically small,
low power, low weight computer system. One consequence of these specifications is that
when compared to other Draper systems, the Beetle has relatively lower throughput for a
given processor technology. Also in accordance with these goals, we have implemented
the fault-tolerant synchronization and voting algorithms in software to avoid the use of
dedicated hardware, which reduces size, power consumption, and weight. Whereas
Draper built prior systems such as FTMP with specific applications in mind, the
Laboratory intends the Beetle for a very wide range of applications. The Beetle is
capable of supporting industry standard operating systems, which allows the end users to
program the Beetle in the way they wish and to run their chosen applications. With this
goal of wide applicability in mind, we have designed Beetle explicitly for cost versus
performance scalability. For example, this would enable the substitution of more
powecrful processors for the ones in the prototype. The resulting system would be more
expensive, but would also be capable of greater throughput. The idea is that each system
can be shifted along the price-performance curve to suit the needs of the individual user.
3.2 Beetle System Description
Three processor boards and the associated inter-processor communication links
comprise the hardware of the Beetle system. A generalized block diagram of this basic
architecture appears in Figure 3.1. Throughout this thesis, we will often refer to the
different processors by the letters A, B, and C for the purposes of clarity. The actual
hardware and software running on each channel is completely identical (except for a very
small amount of authentication information, as we explain in Section 4.1). The
communication links are bi-directional, enabling simultaneous two-way transmission.
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Figure 3.1: Beetle System Architecture.
A key concept to understand is how processors in the Beetle system pass various
data values between themselves. The Beetle reads values from sensors, uses these values
as inputs to calculations, and then votes to determine system output. Figure 3.2 describes
how and when these values are communicated from one processor to another within a
single one of the tasks depicted in Figure 1.1.
When viewing Figure 3.2, keep in mind that an arrow from one channel to another
signifies the transmission of data between the two channels. However, this transfer does
not necessarily occur in a single message. In particular, the Beetle interactive consistency
exchange requires two rounds of message passing between neighboring channels, and the
Beetle voting process requires a single exchange round.
As stated previously, one of the design choices for the Beetle involved
implementing fault-tolerance in software instead of hardware. One reason for this
decision is to provide a fair amount of flexibility in terms of choosing what processors to
use for the individual channels. Once we have developed source code for fault-tolerance
on the prototype, changing the underlying hardware configuration should be relatively
straightforward. We can simply exchange the existing processor boards for ones
containing different processors, and then re-connect the communication links. Most of
the code developed for the prototype should not be hardware dependent, and only the
small amount that is hardware dependent will require modification. Certain sections of
the code also depend on the type of operating system being used, and will need to be
24
Channel B Channel C
I 1.
changed if the operating system is changed. Effecting these minor changes will also
require recompilation of the source code.
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I Time
Figure 3.2: Single Task Information Flow in the Beetle.
This is in stark contrast to the hardware implementation of fault-tolerance in prior
Draper systems, such as the Fault-Tolerant Parallel Processor (FTPP). If the designers
wished to change the underlying hardware in such a system, then the dedicated fault-
tolerant hardware (e.g., network elements in an FTPP) would also need to undergo
revisions. Additionally, in the specific case of the FTPP, updating the type of processor
used in the system would necessitate recompiling the interface software for the network
elements. From an effort standpoint, it is much more difficult to develop a new piece of
hardware and have it manufactured than it is to change a few lines of source code and
recompile. Figure 3.3 illustrates this tradeoff between hardware and software
implemented fault-tolerance.
To summarize, revision of the Beetle system requires mere software
recompilation, while systems using hardware fault-tolerance mechanisms demand
hardware redesign. The slight modifications needed for the dedicated fault-tolerant
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hardware are far more difficult and time-consuming to implement than the slight
modifications needed for the software implementation of fault-tolerance.
Hardware FT Software FT
Implementation Implementation
(FTPP) (Beetle)
Modify Hardware Modify Software
(Network Element) (Low-level Routines)
Manufacture New Recompile Critical
Network Element Source Code StepI auacueNw e~mieIIc i i a
Potentially Modify and
Recompile Network
Element Interface Code
X ~~~~~~~~~A
System
Figure 3.3: Fault-Tolerant System Revision Process.
3.3 A Reduction in Complexity
In Section 2.4, we enumerated the specific hardware requirements for varying
degrees of Byzantine resilience. We now turn our attention to the requirements as
specifically applied to the Beetle architecture. The Beetle is designed to be 1-Byzantine
resilient, meaning that it is capable of tolerating a single fault of any sort. Examining
Table 2.1, and taking the value of f as 1, we see that a system which utilizes
authentication protocols (such as the Beetle) requires three processors, one fewer than the
four required for a system based on unauthenticated message passing. An authentication-
based system also reduces connectivity requirements: each processor requires two
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communication links, as compared to three for each processor in an unauthenticated
system. Therefore, the total number of inter-processor links falls from six to three. So a
traditional 1-Byzantine resilient fault-tolerant computer demands more hardware than the
Beetle does, for the same degree of fault-tolerance.
An architecture which compares easily to the Beetle architecture is that of Draper
Laboratory's FTPP. The FTPP is composed of several parallel processing groups of four
processors apiece; each group is 1-Byzantine resilient. Figure 3.4 demonstrates these
hardware reductions by contrasting a single FTPP processing group with the Beetle
architecture.
IxI /\
P,M,I/O
Quadruplex Processing
Group of the FTPP
NE: Network Element M: Memory
P: Processor I/O: Input/Output
Figure 3.4: Beetle Hardware Reductions.
There is another major hardware reduction involved in the Beetle architecture as
compared with prior Draper systems. The Beetle, with its fault-tolerance implemented in
software, does not require the extra hardware of the FTPP network elements. Figure 3.4
also depicts this fact. However, authentication does not affect the number of
communication rounds needed for Byzantine resilient interactive consistency exchanges;
systems using authentication require two rounds, the same as those systems that do not
use authentication.
We shall now discuss in more detail the connectivity requirement for the Beetle
system. According to Table 2.1, the connectivity of the system must be two. This means
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that there must exist two disjoint paths between any pair of processors. This requirement
is met by the topology of the Beetle architecture. Figure 3.5 demonstrates the reason for
this multipath requirement.
Fault
Figure 3.5: Beetle Connectivity
Suppose that processor C wishes to send the message Z to processor A. Processor C
attempts to use the direct link, but a fault occurs in the sending of the message. However,
the path C-B-A is working correctly and processor C can easily send the information to
processor A in this manner. Note that processor A can determine the existence of a faulty
communication link, and therefore the incorrectness of a received message, due to the
Beetle authentication protocols.
We have already discussed in Chapter 2 what a fault is. We will now discuss how
to count multiple faults, and exactly what meaning the value of f has in the hardware
requirements table. This issue gives rise to the concept of a fault containment region
(FCR). An FCR in the Beetle consists of one processor and its outgoing communication
links. The Beetle has a total of three FCRs. Each FCR is a region of independent power
sourcing and clocking, and each FCR is physically and dielectrically isolated from all of
the other FCRs. The failure model used in the literature to specify the hardware
requirements for Byzantine resilient systems counts all faults occurring in a single FCR
as a single fault. Therefore, f = 1 for the Beetle system means that one FCR is faulty,
and the faulty output of that FCR can be due to any number of faults within the confines
of that specific FCR. The important concept from a system point of view is that the FCR
acts faulty at its boundaries. Figure 3.5 demonstrates the extent of each FCR on the
Beetle.
The FCR model is also the basis for the various fault-tolerance algorithms which
must be implemented to successfully realize the Beetle system. Each FCR maintains its
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own virtual clock, which is updated by the fault-tolerant synchronization algorithm. Each
FCR is guaranteed to have bitwise identical inputs by the interactive consistency
algorithm, executes the same operations on the input data, and therefore should have the
same output. In the presence of faults, a certain FCR may have incorrect outputs, which
will be detected by the voting algorithm. We discuss these algorithms in detail in
Chapter 4.
FCR 2
FCR 3
Figure 3.6: Extent of Beetle Fault Containment Regions.
3.4 Target Applications
The Beetle is not intended for high-throughput purposes. Instead, applications
requiring moderate performance and high-reliability are the target for this architecture.
Using current (1995) processor and communication technology, we believe that the
Beetle is appropriate for applications where system inputs are sampled at 1Hz or 10Hz, as
opposed to 100Hz. The most apparent type of application for the Beetle is as a slow
embedded controller. Characteristics of embedded controllers include the capability to
handle large amounts of sensor and actuator input and output, small size, power, and cost,
highly integrated processors, and the lack of need for high throughput. All of these are
true about the Beetle architecture.
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4. Theoretical Foundations
4.1 Authentication
4.1.1 Overview and Motivation
The use of authentication protocols is the single most important feature of the
Beetle architecture. The decision to use digital signatures to sign and authenticate inter-
processor messages has significant effects on every stage of the system design. All
Byzantine resilient algorithms for authentication systems make assumptions which the
chosen authentication protocol must satisfy. The assumptions are these:
1) The sender's signature cannot be forged.
2) Any alteration of the message-signature pair can be detected by the receiver.
3) The receiver can verify the authenticity of the sender's signature. [LSP82]
No chosen protocol can absolutely assure compliance with these assumptions, due
to the manner in which digital signatures operate. There is always a finite chance of a
malignant channel randomly generating a sequence of bits which will pass the
verification test of a receiving channel. However, a properly chosen protocol will make
the probability of such an event almost infinitesimal.
Let us examine how these assumptions come into play through a series of
examples. In these examples, we shall consider the case where processor A sends a
message to processor C. However, processor B must relay the message from processor A
t, processor C. This affords processor B with an opportunity to modify the contents of
the message-signature pair. If the signatures of all channels are the same, then a faulty
processor can easily cause the downfall of the authentication protocol. Figure 4.1
demonstrates this possibility.
M, S M', S
Figure 4.1: Undetected fault due to non-processor-specific signatures.
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Processor B alters the contents of the message from M to M', and then signs the
message with S. Since signatures are not unique to specific processors, this new
signature produced by processor B is identical to the signature that processor A had
generated. The result is that processor C cannot determine that the message has been
changed and must accept the message as having been sent by processor A. This problem
is correctable by assigning each processor its own specific signature, as Figure 4.2
displays.
Figure 4.2: Detected fault with processor-specific signatures.
This time when processor C receives the message-signature pair which processor
A has allegedly spawned, it immediately notices that the signature belongs to processor
B. Processor C then determines that one of two events has occurred: either that
processor B signed the message, not processor A, or that the message-signature pair was
corrupted in transmission. In either case, there is no chance that processor C will treat the
message as having been correctly signed by processor A. We therefore show that
processor signatures need to be unforgeable, and thereby validate the existence of the first
assumption.
However, relying solely upon processor-specific signatures is not sufficiently
robust for our purposes. Processor-specific messages prevent faults of the sort depicted
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, but our protocol must detect other possibilities. For example,
suppose that processor B alters the message, while leaving processor A's signature
untouched. With signatures that are only processor-specific, the signature is still valid,
and processor C incorrectly accepts the message. Figure 4.3 illustrates an example of this
type of fault.
Figure 4.3: Undetected fault due to non-message-specific signatures.
There is a way to deal with this, however. The solution is to force signatures to be
message-specific, as well as processor-specific. A generating function for this kind of
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signature produces variations in the signature for different messages. This scheme easily
prevents the aforementioned type of error, as Figure 4.4 shows.
Figure 4.4: Detected fault with message-specific signatures.
Processor C rejects the faulty message M' because the original signature from
processor A does not match the corrupted message with which it arrived. Processor C
therefore detects the fault. This example confirms the need for the second and third
assumptions in our list. With processor- and message-specific signatures, the receiving
processor can easily detect any alteration of the message-signature pair it has received
(2). To do this, the receiver must be able to verify the authenticity of the sender's
signature (3).
There is another requirement that the authentication protocol selected for the
Beetle system must fulfill, and that is to make message signatures be time-specific. The
protocol accomplishes this by requiring that every processor include in each message it
sends a sequence number, which indicates the relative time at which that processor
originated that message. Let us examine how this concept can be useful.
Another possible fault that could occur in the transmission of our example
message is that processor B delays relaying the message to processor C for some length
of time. In the interim, a message which originated with processor A after the delayed
message makes its way to processor C. Processor B then sends the delayed message
along to processor C. This out of order receipt of messages can certainly cause problems
for processor C, and must be detected. Figure 4.5 gives an example of such a situation.
Figure 4.5: Undetected fault due to non-time-specific signatures.
Processor C receives the second message (M2) before the first (M1), but has no
way of knowing this fact. Neither the contents of the messages nor their signatures have
been altered in any way, so processor C could have problems if the information in the
messages is of a sequentially-dependent nature. There is a solution to this problem,
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namely to attach monotonically increasing sequence numbers to each message. Figure
4.6 demonstrates the effects of this information.
Figure 4.6: Detected fault with time-specific signatures.
Now processor C compares the sequence number of the incoming message from
processor A to the sequence number most recently received from processor A. If the new
sequence number is larger than the previous one, processor C accepts the message
(providing, of course, that the signature is also correct). In the example above, when
processor C compares the sequence number of M1 to the sequence number of M2, it
immediately realizes that the messages are out of order. Processor C then takes steps to
re-order, discard, or otherwise deal with these interchanged messages.
We have thus determined the characteristics that the Beetle message
authentication system must possess. Following an extensive investigation by Anne Clark,
[C194] is the chosen Beetle authentication protocol, a public key cryptosystem which
incorporates sequence numbers. We discuss the specifics of this system in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Origins
The idea for and terminology of public key cryptosystems originates in a seminal
paper by Diffie and Hellman [DH76]. The generalized problem to which the authors
propose a solution is that of providing secret communications over an unsafe channel. In
a public key cryptosystem, each participant has an enciphering key and a deciphering
key. The enciphering keys of all participants are globally available to all other
participants (public), and a participant's deciphering key is known only to that participant
(private). All participants have access to the same public communication channel. When
participant A wishes to send a message to participant B, participant A encrypts the
message using participant B's enciphering key and sends the message across the public
communication channel. This allows all participants access to the encrypted version of
the message, but only participant B can decipher the message and read the contents. We
will refer to this type of public key cryptosystem as Type I. Figure 4.7 depicts a Type I
public key cryptosystem.
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Figure 4.7: Generalized Type I public key cryptosystem.
The following excerpt from Diffie and Hellman's paper contains a more
formalized definition of a public key cryptosystem.
A public key cryptosystem is a pair of families {EK }Ke{K} and {DK }Ke{K of
algorithms representing invertible transformations,
EK:{M} -> {M}
DK:{M} ({M}
on a finite message space {M}, such that
1 for every key K E {K}, EK is the inverse of DK,
2) for every K E {K} and M E {M}, the algorithms EK and DK are easy to compute,
3) for almost every K e {K}, each easily computed algorithm equivalent to DK is
computationally infeasible to derive from EK, and
4) for every K E {K}, it is feasible to compute inverse pairs EK and DK from K.
[DH76]
The third condition is very important, since it makes possible the public revelation
of the enciphering keys without compromising the security of the deciphering keys.
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman at M.I.T. invented the first widely accepted system (known
as RSA encoding) which met the conditions specified by Diffie and Hellman [RSA78].
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4.1.3 Beetle Implementation
The public key cryptosystem we actually employ in the Beetle system differs
from the original system described by Diffie and Hellman in several very important ways.
In Diffie and Hellman's system, the sender of an original message (the plaintext)
performs encryption using the public enciphering key of the intended recipient. The
sender then transmits this encoded result (the ciphertext) across an insecure
communication link. Once the message reaches its destination, the receiver translates the
ciphertext back into the plaintext through use of its private deciphering key. In this way,
it is possible only for the designated receiver to read the contents of each message.
However, there is no means available in this system for preventing one participant from
masquerading as another. Each message has only one possible recipient, but many
possible originators.
In the Beetle system, which is a fault-tolerant system, we place a premium upon
being able to prevent exactly this type of malicious behavior. The very idea of one
processor pretending to be a different processor is a typical example of a Byzantine
failure. The examples of section 4.1.1 illustrate the possible complications graphically.
The Beetle requires a scheme in which each message has only one possible originator,
and many possible recipients. We will refer to this type of public key cryptosystem as
Type II. Figure 4.8 shows a general system of this type.
Implementation of message passing based upon a Type II public key cryptosystem
involves switching the roles of the public and private keys, as compared to their roles in a
Type I cryptosystem. Each processor in the Beetle system has access to all of the
deciphering (public) keys, and to its own enciphering (private) key. Therefore, in the
Beetle triplex, processor A's signature can only be generated by processor A (i.e., only
processor A can encipher a message using its private key), and both processors B and C
can easily verify that it was indeed processor A that sent the message.
Another important point to mention is that messages in the Beetle system are
signed, and are not themselves encrypted. An actual transmission between two
processors involves sending first the unencrypted message, then the associated signature.
This means that the data in Beetle messages are not protected from being read by any
processor, but that a processor can confirm the source of any message. Secrecy is not the
goal in this system; integrity and authenticity are. Figure 4.9 diagrams how the Beetle
authentication system operates between any pair of processors.
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II public key cryptosystem.
The sender A signs the message M with its signing function, SA . The private key
for processor A provides the basis of this signing function. The result is the signature S,
which processor A appends to the end of M. The sending processor A then transmits the
unencrypted message M and the signature to the receiving processor B. To authenticate
the message, processor B puts the signature through processor A's checking function, CA.
The public key for processor A provides the basis of this checking function. Processor B
will accept the message if and only if the signature authenticates.
<M, S>
Communication Link
Sign with S=SA(M) Authenticate with CA(S)=M
Figure 4.9: Beetle Authentication System.
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The signing and checking functions used in the Beetle system are 32-bit modular
multiplications. The public and private keys are 32-bit numbers with a special property:
they are 32-bit modular inverses of each other. The modular multiplication of these two
keys will therefore yield a product equal to one. To generate a signature for a message,
the signing function first calculates the 32-bit checksum of the message. The signing
function then multiplies the checksum and the private key together, and uses the resulting
product as the signature.
The following equations formally describe this process. P is the private key, P-
is the public key, C is the calculated checksum of the message, and S is the signature.
P P- (mod23 2) = 1 (4.1)
S=C P(mod23 2) (4.2)
S P- (mod 2 32) = C P P-l(mod 232) = C(mod 2 32 ) (4.3)
Equation 4.1 expresses the modular inverse relationship between the public and
private keys. In Equation 4.2, a modular multiplication of the checksum and the private
key generates the signature. Equation 4.3 describes the process which the checking
function executes upon the received signature. The checking function performs a
modular multiplication of with the signature and the public key, leaving only the
checksum behind. If this checksum computed from the signature matches the checksum
which the checking function calculates from the bits of the received message, then the
message authenticates. The receiving processor then accepts as valid the actual
information contained in the message.
4.1.4 Finding 32-bit Modular Inverses
We need a method for calculating the three pairs of 32-bit modular inverses
required by the Beetle. Our selected method employs an extended version of Euclid's
algorithm for calculating the greatest common divisor of two numbers, which Donald
Knuth describes in The Art of Computer Programming [Knu69].
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Euclid's algorithm determines the greatest common divisor of two numbers. The
extension devised by Knuth calculates two more related values. The greatest common
divisor of two numbers can be expressed as a linear combination of the two numbers
themselves. If the two numbers are u and v, then
u u' +v v' = gcd(u, v), (4.4)
where u' and v' are the weighting factors applied to u and v, respectively. We can use
this to calculate modular inverses in the following manner. Set v equal to the modulus
(232 in this case), and set u equal to a prospective 32-bit key. Then employ the extended
algorithm, thereby determining the value of the greatest common divisor, as well as the
values of u' and v'. If the gcd(u,v) is 1 and if u' is a positive number, then we have
found a modular inverse pair. One key is u, and u' is the other. The number v' is of no
interest in this application. The algorithm guarantees that
u u' (mod 232) = 1, (4.5)
which is Equation 4.1 with different notation. We generated the public and private keys
for the Beetle prototype with a computer program in C employing the extended algorithm
in this manner. Table 4.1 displays the specific numbers for the implementation.
Private Ke
Public Ke
Channel A
2a569ef9
701dc349
Channel B
3642610b
298262a3
Channel C
cfleed0f
4cd261ef
Table 4.1: Beetle Private and Public Keys.
4.1.5 Robustness
These signing and checking functions based on modular multiplication do not
provide an ultra-secure cryptosystem. In particular, this method does not satisfy
condition 3 as set forth by Diffie and Hellman. Knowledge of the public key of a certain
channel, and knowledge of the modular multiplication scheme, allows a malicious
channel to calculate the private key of the other channel. The private key can be found
easily enough by applying Euclid's Extended Algorithm in a reverse fashion, to find the
32-bit modular inverse of the public key. As mentioned previously, a method such as
RSA would correctly meet the conditions specified by Diffie and Hellman.
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So why does the Beetle system use a less secure cryptosystem? The signing and
checking scheme of the Beetle authentication system is efficient, requiring less
computation time than more robust RSA-type methods. RSA would be more secure, but
would require more overhead time, and in this particular system, we have resolved to
keep fault-tolerance overhead to an absolute minimum. The present system is effective
against random faults, but is vulnerable to attacks from faulty channels which have
cryptanalytical capabilities. Ralph Galetti discusses the robustness of this scheme in
further detail in his M.I.T. Master's thesis [Ga190].
4.2 Clock Synchronization
4.2.1 Overview
As we described in Chapter 1, the key idea behind fault-tolerance in a distributed
system is that redundant channels are provided with identical inputs and execute identical
instruction streams. Then the system votes the various channel outputs to determine its
overall output. To accomplish these goals, it is necessary for the individual channels to
be synchronized with each other. In fact, fault-tolerance cannot be achieved in an
asynchronous system, as mentioned in Section 1.2. In the Beetle system, this means that
each channel maintains a virtual clock which is synchronized to within a known skew of
the virtual clocks of each of the other two channels.
4.2.2 Key Synchronization Issues
All processor boards on the market today include at least one, and most often,
more than one crystal oscillator. The vibrations of these crystals are extremely regular in
nature, and are used to generate the various clocking signals required by the board. These
oscillations are also used to generate consistent processor interrupts of a constant
frequency, to accommodate various timing functions needed by the operating system and
possibly the user. Creating and updating a virtual clock for the purpose of task
scheduling and fault-tolerance is exactly such a user process.
In the Beetle prototype, we designate the time between successive timer interrupts
generated by one of the on-board oscillators as the least significant "bit" of the virtual
clock. Each of these time slices between interrupts, which are generally on the order of
milliseconds, is termed a "tick," and the virtual clock tracks time in ticks. However, these
interrupts are not initially synchronized, nor can they ever be synchronized in our
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implementation. They will merely trigger interrupts by their natural oscillations, which
cannot be affected by the user. We could initially synchronize the timer interrupts
themselves, but we do not do this in the Beetle system for reasons involving portability
between operating systems and development costs associated with the time needed to
implement such a synchronization. Therefore, the timer interrupts occur at different
times on different channels. Figure 4.10 presents these concepts visually. Notice that the
length of a tick on all three channels is (almost exactly) the same. Also note that,
although in the figure timer interrupts occur in the same relative order across the channels
each time, due to clock drift, this is not the case over a long period of time.
Ticks C.r T,r to
A
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Figure 4.10: Timer Interrupts on the Beetle.
When the user powers up the system, the virtual clocks are initially synchronized.
That is, at a given point in real time, the next timer interrupt on each of the three channels
is designated as the start of the first clock frame and the tick counter is reset to zero.
From that time forward, every occurrence of a timer interrupt causes the tick counter to
be incremented by one. Once the virtual clocks have been initialized, it is up to the
chosen synchronization algorithm to keep them synchronized. Clock frames are intervals
which consist of a certain number of ticks, during which the system schedules the
execution of fault-tolerant tasks.
Our present initial synchronization method is not fault-tolerant; that is, a single
faulty communication link can ruin the process. To accomplish a fault-tolerant initial
synchronization, we will eventually implement an extended version of the current clock
synchronization algorithm. This extension allows new processors to join the currently
synchronized group [HSSD83].
Another issue which we must consider is clock drift. The crystal oscillators are
not perfect; that is, there is a very small but finite amount of deviation in the time
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between successive oscillations. Due to this drift, the interval between timer interrupts is
not exactly constant, and therefore the time as registered by the virtual clocks will also
drift. This is the critical reason for periodic resynchronization. In addition, this means
that the skew between virtual clocks will be constantly shifting. Clock skew between
channels is therefore not a constant, and can only be characterized in terms of a
minimum, maximum, or average. Figure 4.11 depicts clock skew between the channels
in the Beetle system.
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Figure 4.1 1: Clock Skew Between Channels.
The values of Tskew in Figure 4.11 are constantly changing between every
synchronization. In fact, oscillator drift is enough of a factor that over a long enough
period of time, the relative ordering of the virtual clocks on the three channels can
change.
4.2.3 Synchronization Algorithm
To synchronize the three Beetle processors, we employ an algorithm described by
Halpern, Simons, Strong, and Dolev [HSSD83]. This algorithm provides a method for
maintaining the synchrony of virtual clocks in distributed systems, using authentication to
guarantee the validity of inter-processor messages. The algorithm makes use of three
major assumptions, which we shall discuss.
For the purposes of this algorithm, we note the difference between Newtonian
time, which is unobservable real time, and clock time, which is the time as measured on
the virtual clock of a processor. The virtual clock Ci(t) represents the virtual time on
processor i's clock at real time t. A correct clock has a rate of drift from Newtonian time
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which is bounded by a known constant p > 0. The drift assumption Al defines this
constant, where tl and t2 are any two Newtonian times:
Al: (1 + p)- '(t2 - tl) < Ci(t2) - Ci (tl) < (1 + p)(t2 - tl). (4.6)
It is possible to show that the drift between any two non-faulty clocks is bounded by
dr = p(2 + p) (4.7)
l+p
meaning that over a period of u seconds during which no synchronizations occur, the
deviation between any two non-faulty clocks is bounded by
up(2 + p) (4.8)
l+p
The next assumption A2 involves the transmission of synchronization messages.
We assume that there is a known upper bound tdel (transmission delay) on the time t
required for a short message of the form "The time is T" to be prepared, transmitted to all
neighboring processors, received, and digested by all the correct processors that receive
it. The constraint on t is
A2: 0 < t < tdel. (4.9)
The final assumption A3 is that the signatures employed by the algorithm are
unforgeable.
A3: The processors are numbered 1,2,...,n. Processor i uses an encoding function Ei
to encode a message M so that:
(a) no processor other than i can generate or alter the encoded
message E[M] (i.e., no message can be forged),
(b) if processor j receives Ei[M], it can decode M and determine that
i was the processor that sent the message (i.e., messages can be
authenticated).
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This algorithm models resynchronization (i.e., adjustment of each processor's
virtual clock by comparing its virtual time with that of the other two processors) of a
given processor by starting a "new" virtual clock. After the kth synchronization,
processor i has clock Cik running as its current virtual clock. Beginnings and ends are
defined as follows: begk is the Newtonian time that the first non-faulty processor starts
its kth clock, and endk is the Newtonian time that the last non-faulty processor starts its
kth clock. The interval [begk,endk] is referred to as the kth synchronization interval.
Figure 4.12 illustrates these quantities, as they appear in the context of the overall
synchronization algorithm.
Figure 4.12: Overview of Synchronization Algorithm.
Examining Figure 4.12, one can begin to understand how the algorithm operates.
Each time a synchronization occurs, each processor starts a new clock, and discards the
old one. A new clock corresponds to a new clock frame, and the processor resets the
intra-frame tick counter to zero. Every time a timer interrupt occurs, the interrupt service
routine increments the tick counter by one. The tick counter corresponds to the virtual
time on virtual clock Cik. The next synchronization will occur when the number of ticks
equals the value of PER.
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This clock synchronization algorithm maintains the following three properties for
all correct processors.
CS 1: There is an upper bound DMAX > 0 on the difference between correct
processors' kth clocks, defined as
ICik(t)- Cjk(t)l< DMAX, (4.10)
where t is any Newtonian time.
CS2: The amount by which a processor must adjust its virtual clock is positive and
upper-bounded (virtual clocks are never set back) by a constant ADJ, defined as
0 < Cik(t)- Cik-l(t) < ADJ, (4.11)
where t is any Newtonian time.
CS3: The length of the synchronization interval is small and upper-bounded by a
constant dmin, defined as
0 < endk - begk < dmin. (4.12)
Two tasks comprise the algorithm: a Time Monitor task and a Message Manager
task. In the descriptions of these tasks, we use the following notation (Figure 4.12 also
shows these values):
ETi= expected time of the next synchronization for processor i,
CURRENT = current clock being used by processor i,
Cik = time on the kth clock on processor i,
PER = time between successive synchronizations,
D, DMAX = upper bound on the deviation between any two correct clocks.
The distinction between D and DMAX is rather subtle. DMAX is the actual deviation
between correct clocks (Tskew) in Newtonian time. D is a value greater than or equal to
DMAX, which is used by the Message Manager Task of the algorithm (described later in
this section) to determine the window of validity for incoming synchronization messages.
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The value of D cannot be strictly equal to DMAX for implementation specific reasons.
For instance, in the Beetle system we mark the passage of time by counting interrupt
generated timer ticks, thereby limiting the resolution of measurable time. We must
therefore express D in terms of timer ticks.
PER and D are parameters of the synchronization algorithm. We must choose
values for these quantities which meet the following constraints:
Drift Inequality: D > (1 + p)d min+ dr(l + p)PER (4.13)
and
Interval Separation: PER > dmin(l + p)+ fpD, (4.14)
where f is the maximum number of processor failures in the system.
Once PER and D have been determined, compute the following:
DMAX = (1 + p)d min+ dr(l + p)PER (4.15)
and
ADJ = (f + 1)D. (4.16)
When the tasks are started on processor i, ETi = PER, CURRENTj = 0, and
Ci° = 0. The formal description of the two clock synchronization tasks follows, as
represented in the paper by Halpern, et al.:
Task TM (Time Monitor). When the current clock of processor i reads ETj, processor i
signs and sends an encoded message to all processors saying "The time is ET,." A new
clock is started with time ETi, and both ET and CURRENTj are incremented. The
"pseudocode" is:
If Cik = ET1 then begin
SIGN AND SEND "The time is ETi";
CURRENTi:= CURRENTi + 1;
Cik+l:= ETi;
ET,: = ET, + PER;
end.
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Task MSG (Message Manager). Suppose processor i receives an authentic message with
s distinct signatures saying "The time is T" (i.e. an unforgeable message that has been
signed by s distinct processors and not altered in any way). Then if the message arrives
at a "reasonable time," processor i updates both ET, and the current interval and signs
and sends out the message. Otherwise the message is ignored. More formally:
If processor i receives an authentic message M at virtual time C k with s distinct
signatures saying "The time is T" then
if T = ETi and ET, - sD < Cik then begin
SIGN AND SEND M;
CURRENTi := CURRENTi + 1;
Cik+l:= ETi;
ETi:= ET i + PER;
end.
4.3 Voting
4.3.1 Overview
The Beetle needs a voting algorithm to determine the system output from the
outputs of the three individual channels. If we determine the inputs to each of the
channels for the computation by an interactive consistency exchange (in which case they
are guaranteed to be bitwise identical on all non-faulty channels), then the voting of
outputs can consist of the mere exchanging of values by all of the three channels.
4.3.2 Voting Algorithm
A processor initiates a vote by sending a message containing the results of its
calculation to each of the other two processors. The other two processors follow suit, and
each processor gathers these values and stores them in a buffer. Each processor then
invokes the voting choice function, which compares the values from other processors
with the local result and determines a output value. Each correct processor in the system
is then left in possession of the overall output value for the calculation that the system has
just performed. Figure 4.13 describes the voting process from a system point of view.
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e Choice F
Figure 4.13: Beetle Voting Process.
The key step in this process is the choice function, which determines exactly what
the output value will be. The choice function is required to calculate the same value on
all non-faulty channels. On a certain channel, if the vote messages from both of the other
processors authenticate, then the most obvious idea is to perform a majority comparison.
If one processor's value is in error, then it will be out-voted by the correct values.
This function should modify its operation when the local processor receives
unauthenticated messages. Using this conditional voting, if one or both of the received
messages do not authenticate, the majority function should change its procedure to vote
only the host value and the possibly one valid received value and ignore the
unauthenticated value(s).
4.3.3 Determination of System Output
At the termination of the voting process on the Beetle system, each non-faulty
channel is in possession of the correct system output. The issue then arises of how to use
this output in a real world application. We intend the Beetle to be used as a highly
reliable embedded controller for a large variety of commercial applications. A typical
application would involve input from a range of sensors and output to a range of
actuators. The Beetle system handles the input from these sensors through the interactive
consistency function, as we explain in Section 4.4. Voting determines what the Beetle
output should be, but not how to use this information to interface with the process being
controlled. In this subsection, we discuss several schemes for effecting control of
actuators.
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The first scheme involves use of the ethernet ports on the processor boards.
Suppose that we connect an ethernet with to three boards and the actuator being
controlled, as in Figure 4.14.
Ethernet
Figure 4.14: Actuator Interface Scheme #1.
One of the channels, e.g., processor C, is designated as the mouthpiece of the
system. Processor C is then responsible for communicating the result of its vote over the
ethernet link to the servomechanism which actually controls the actuator in question.
With this setup, both processors A and B can eavesdrop on the information that processor
C sends to the servo by reading the packets on the ethernet link. All three processors then
perform an interactive consistency exchange (as described in Section 4.4) for this
information. If processor C becomes faulty and the information going to the servo is
incorrect, processors A and B can cut off the power to processor C and designate a new
mouthpiece processor. At this point, processors A and B would inform the user that
processor C is faulty and must be serviced. The interactive consistency exchange ensures
that a faulty reading of the ethernet by either processor A or B cannot crash the system,
since the faulty read is masked by the correct read of the other processor and the correct
information in the possession of processor C.
A second possible scheme is to use a voting actuator, as in Figure 4.15. In this
arrangement, each individual channel has a dedicated servo through which it
communicates with the actuator. On the market today are voting actuators, which take
inputs from multiple sources and arbitrate between the input values to determine the level
of action. The feedback mechanisms built into the servos will help to automatically
correct for a faulty processor. If processor B is faulty and sends a value that is far from
the correct values sent by the other two processors, the results are combined and the
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actuator moves a certain amount. When the processors receive back the result of the
action, they can then adjust their instructions to the actuator dynamically. The feedback
path provides a decent level of fault-tolerance.
Figure 4.15: Actuator Interface Scheme #2.
There is also a third possibility for interfacing the Beetle outputs with an actuator.
Figure 4.16 diagrams this approach. In this scheme, each channel determines an output
value. As this occurs, each processor receives a value from each of the other two
processors. When the consensus output has been determined, each processor can
determine which if either of the other processors does not agree with the overall result. If
processor B decides that processor A is faulty since it sent out an erroneous value, it can
open the output switches that it controls within processor A's switching unit. Processor C
should also conclude that processor A is faulty, and likewise open its switches. This
disables each of the three paths from the output of processor A to the servo of processor
A. Processor A's voted consensus value (whether correct or not) is then masked from
affecting the action of the actuator being controlled by the result of the task execution. At
the same time, processors B and C agree with each other, and therefore allow each other
to transmit their values to their respective servos, and the actuator is correctly controlled.
Other possibilities for output determination include combinations of several of
these schemes. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 show two such combinations. The choice of one of
these particular schemes or hybrid schemes depends upon the application of the Beetle
system, on the available resources, and the degree of redundancy desired.
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Figure 4.16: Actuator Interface Scheme #3.
51
Data
I'
AB f fBB/C/C/
r I I
Ethernet
Figure 4.17: Hybrid Actuator Interface Scheme #1.
I
D: Data Line
C: Control Signal
Figure 4.18: Hybrid Actuator Interface Scheme #2.
4.4 Interactive Consistency
4.4.1 Overview
The voting function assures that each of the individual non-faulty processors
correctly determine the system output. Conversely, the purpose of the interactive
consistency function is to ensure that each channel is initialized with identical input data
at the start of each computation. The interactive consistency function will use an
information exchange very much similar to the voting function.
An example of typical data that must be identical on each channel is a reading of a
certain value from a sensor. The sensor could be sensing temperature, velocity,
acceleration, atmospheric pressure, or any of a host of other external conditions; the
specifics are completely application-dependent. What we are concerned with is
52
guaranteeing that each channel uses precisely the same value as each of the others in its
local computation: the inputs must bitwise identical across channels. Figure 4.19
illustrates the problem.
Sensor
Reading
BAC
Time
Figure 4.19: Effect of Clock Skew Upon Sensor Readings.
Suppose that each channel is equipped with a dedicated sensor which senses the
value of a certain external variable. All three sensors sense the same external variable.
When the application running on the Beetle needs this input, it signals each channel to
read the value on its particular sensor at a given time. Now, even though the virtual time
is the same for each channel, clock skew prevents all channels from reading their sensors
at the same instant of Newtonian time. The synchronization algorithm only guarantees
virtual clock synchronization to "within a known skew." Therefore, one channel will be
first to read its sensor, then another channel, and then the last channel. It is very possible
that all three channels will read different values. We need a function that will take these
three values and calculate a single value which will actually be used by all three channels
during the upcoming computation.
This function is the interactive consistency choice function, and can be
implemented in several different ways. The function could choose the median value of
the three, or it could calculate an average and return value. Anne Clark discusses a
suitable function in [C194]. The interactive consistency choice function is not yet
implemented in the Beetle prototype, and could well be application-specific.
4.4.2 Impact of Authentication
The interactive consistency exchange provides a very good example of how the
use of authentication protocols significantly impacts the Beetle architecture. Using
digital signatures to verify the contents of received messages allows a reduction in
processors from four to three, as mentioned in Section 3.3. Interactive consistency is
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attained through an information exchange involving all of the processors. Figure 4.20
contains a diagram which illustrates this type of exchange on a Byzantine resilient
quadruplex which does not use authentication. Recall that Byzantine resilient exchanges
require two rounds of message passing to withstand a single Byzantine failure, as
mentioned in Section 3.3.
First Exchange Round Second Exchange Round
Correct Value: X All processors can vote
Corrupted Value: Y the correct value
Figure 4.20: Message Passing in a Quadruplex System.
Examining Figure 4.20, consider the case in which processor A wishes to
communicate the result of its sensor read to each of the other processors in the system.
The value that processor A calculates is X, but the message sent to processor B becomes
corrupted in transit and delivers the value Y. Processor B has no way of knowing that the
value has been corrupted, and accepts Y as the correct value sent by processor A. This
error then propagates in the second round of message passing, as processor B relays the
value Y to both Processors C and D. However, the system can tolerate this single error,
since each processor receives two correct values and one corrupted value. Each channel
can perform a simple majority vote, and all processors will determine the correct value.
In order for this type of voting to work correctly, each processor must be connected to
and receive values from three other processors. This makes for a total of four processors
required to perform this "nested" vote.
If the system uses digital signatures to authenticate the inter-processor messages,
the number of processors required decreases. Examine in Figure 4.21 the same situation
of processor A communicating the value X to the other two processors.
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Message with the corrupted value All processors possess
does not authenticate at C the correct value
Figure 4.21: Message Passing in the Beetle Triplex.
As before, the value that processor A sends to one of the other processors (in this
case, processor C) is corrupted during transmission. However, now processor C detects
this corruption by checking the signature attached to the received message. The signature
does not authenticate, and processor C discards the incorrect value of Y which it received
from processor A. Then in the second round of exchange, processor C receives the
correct value X from processor B. Now both processors B and C are in possession of the
correct value, and the information exchange has successfully occurred. The use of
authentication discovers and handles the transmission error, and the "nested" vote of the
Byzantine quadruplex is no longer necessary.
We can also show that three processors are sufficient to tolerate a single faulty
processor, not just a faulty communication link. Figure 4.22 depicts such a traitorous
processor sending the value X to processor B and the value Y to processor C. However,
processor A signs both messages correctly and, therefore, both messages authenticate at
their respective destinations.
In the second round of exchange both processors B and C relay their received
values to each other. At the end of the second round, both processors are in possession of
two equally authentic values that originated with processor A. Faced with this evidence,
both processors may conclude that processor A is in error, and disregard both values.
These processors can also send appropriate error messages to the user.
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First Exchange Round
Second Exchange Round
It
Processor A maliciously
sends two different values
Processors B and C conclude
that Processor A is faulty
Figure 4.22: Detection of a Faulty Processor.
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First Exchange Round
5. Implementation of Prototype
5.1 Hardware
The Beetle system prototype consists of three off-the-shelf processor boards and
the associated communication links and power supplies. The Beetle processor boards are
PCII+ boards from Megatel Computer Corporation and are based on the Intel 80386SL
25 MHz microprocessor. Each PCII+ has one megabyte of data storage on a Flash
EPROM and four megabytes of dynamic RAM. A host of input/output options are
available on each board, including Ethernet LAN, three RS-232, SCSI, IDE, parallel,
keyboard, video, LCD, PC/104, and floppy disk connections.
The operating system for each processor board is DOS 6.2. The Flash EPROM
on each board is configured to act as a hard disk, and operates as the C: drive. It is in the
EPROM that we store the executable code for the fault-tolerance mechanisms of the
Beetle. We then run the code from the DOS command line.
The inter-processor communication occurs over serial links, utilizing the RS-232
ports. The rate of transmission is 19,200 bits per second with no parity, eight data bits,
and one stop bit. At first these serial links proved to be rather noisy, resulting in many bit
errors in the messages. We traced this problem to the drifting of the ground potential
between channels. The drift often caused correct voltages at the sending end of the link
to be interpreted incorrectly at the receiving end. We solved this problem by forcing all
three channels to use a common ground. Now, messages are almost never corrupted
during transmission, and therefore almost always authenticate. Even so, while the error
lasted, it proved to be a good source of faults for testing our communication protocols.
We have equipped each board with a dedicated power supply. The power
supplies are responsible for converting the standard North American 110 volts of
alternating current into 5 volts of direct current power. The Megatel board requires this 5
volts DC to operate. The key concept is that each board has a dedicated power supply,
each of which can be connected to different external power circuits. Then, if one power
circuit has a failure, the other two boards are unaffected. This is necessary to preserve the
isolation of one fault-containment region from the others.
We must discuss the dielectric isolation of fault-containment regions in further
detail. In the current implementation, we do not preserve dielectric isolation between
FCRs. The first violation of FCR boundaries is the sharing of ground for each channel.
Current may flow freely between FCRs, possibly clearing the way for one faulty power
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supply to affect more than its own FCR. We can solve this problem by inserting three
series resistors into the inter-channel ground connections, as Figure 5.1 shows.
Figure 5.1: Desired Beetle Power Supply Configuration.
These resistors should be small, perhaps capable of dissipating a quarter watt.
This means that any significant current flow between two channels will burn out the
connecting resistor, thereby isolating the faulty processor/power supply pair.
There is another issue of dielectric isolation which we must resolve. The RS-232
communication links are also capable of delivering damaging amounts of current from a
faulty processor to a correct processor. Here we will diagram two possible methods for
avoiding this type of problem. The first is insertion of series resistors in the RS-232
links, in similar fashion to the common ground connections. Figure 5.2 depicts this
solution.
Processor A RS-232 Cable Processor B
Tx
Rx
Gnd
- AAA H
-. w--- V V ¥
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Rx:
Gnd:
Figure 5.2: FCR Isolation for Communication Links
Transmit Pin
Receive Pin
Ground
Scheme #1.
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In this scheme, we connect small resistors in series with each of the transmit/receive
connections and each of the ground connections. Any abnormally high level of current
flow will burn up the appropriate resistor and ensure FCR isolation.
Figure 5.3 shows a second method for ensuring dielectric isolation between
channels. In this scheme, we attach special adapters to the communication ports which
convert the RS-232 format to optical format for transmission across fiber optic cable. We
then string fiber optic cable between the adapters, and current is unable to flow between
FCRs.
Processor A Processor B
Tx
Rx
Gnd
I
er
a Fiber Optic Cable
Rx
Tx
Gnd
Tx: Transmit Pin
Rx: Receive Pin
Gnd: Ground
Figure 5.3: FCR Isolation for Communication Links Scheme #2.
A scheme to improve dielectric isolation such as the one in Figure 5.3 is not difficult to
implement, but it would increase the cost of manufacturing each system (we would need
to purchase the necessary adapters). This is a tradeoff that we must carefully consider.
5.2 Message Passing
The processors in the Beetle system communicate by sending messages across
their RS-232 serial links. Each message consists of a header, the data to be
communicated, and a trailer. Figure 5.4 depicts the Beetle message structure (not drawn
to scale).
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Header I Data Trailer
(4 bytes) (variable) (41 bytes)
Figure 5.4: Beetle Message Structure.
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Two fields comprise the header of each message. The first field contains the total
size of the message in bytes, and the second field gives the type of the message.
Currently, the Beetle utilizes two types of messages: synchronization messages and
voting messages. Each field in the header is 16 bits (2 bytes) in length. Figure 5.5
diagrams the message header.
I Size I Type l
Figure 5.5: Message Header Structure.
Each message contains a variable amount of data, depending upon the type of the
message. The final portion of every message is the trailer, as Figure 5.6 shows. The
trailer contains fields for the sequence number and the timestamp of the message, which
are each 64 bits (8 bytes) long. Then comes an 8 bit (1 byte) field which gives the
number of signatures for the message. The final portion of the trailer consists of three
processor ID-signature field pairs. One pair is reserved for each Beetle processor, in the
order A, B, C. Within each pair, a 32 bit (4 byte) processor ID number precedes the 32
bit (4 byte) checksum-based signature generated by that processor for the given message.
If a certain processor has not signed that message, then the corresponding ID and
signature fields remain blank (initialized with all bits not set).
Sequence Time Processor A Processor B Processor C
Number Stamp _ ID | Sig ID I Sig ID I Sig
#: Number of Signatures ID: Processor ID Sig: Signature
Figure 5.6: Message Trailer Structure.
We have previously discussed the motivation for all of the information contained
in all of these trailer fields except for the timestamp. The timestamp is a snapshot of the
virtual time on the originating processor at the time that it created the message. We do
not currently use this information for any fault-tolerance related function, but could
certainly do so in the future as work on the Beetle system continues.
5.3 Message Processing: Signing and Authenticating
The first step a processor takes when generating a signature for a message is to
calculate the 32-bit checksum of the message. The processor accomplishes this in the
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following fashion. The processor fills the fields of transmit message buffer with the
appropriate information: message size, message type, data, sequence number, and
timestamp. Then the processor adds the first 32 bits of the transmit message buffer to the
second 32 bits, and then adds the next 32 bits, and so on until the sum incorporates every
bit of this information. This sum does not include the bits of the signature count field or
the three processor ID-signature pairs.
The next steps in signature generation involve retrieving the private key of the
host processor, and multiplying the key by the checksum in a 32-bit modular fashion.
The product is the signature and the processor places this result in the appropriate
signature field in the transmit message buffer. We summarize the steps for signing a
message in the following list:
Sign1) Calculate 32-bit checksum of the message to be transmitted.
Sign2) Look up the private key of the host processor.
Sign3) Perform a 32-bit modular multiplication of the checksum and the private key.
Sign4) Put the result in the appropriate signature field in the outgoing message buffer.
SignS) Increment the "number of signatures" counter.
The steps for authenticating a message are very similar, and we summarize them
in the following list:
Authl) Calculate 32-bit checksum of appropriate portion of received message.
Auth2) Look up the public key of the originating processor.
Auth3) Perform a 32-bit modular multiplication of the checksum and the private key.
Auth4) Compare the result with the signature from the appropriate signature field.
Both synchronization and interactive consistency require messages to be relayed
through processors. A relayed message is signed by two processors: the originating
processor, and the relaying processor. When this occurs, it is necessary for the third
processor to authenticate both of the signatures before accepting the message.
5.4 Synchronization
The PCII+ board generates a timing interrupt which is consistent with all IBM-
standard personal computers. This interrupt occurs at a rate of 18.2065 hertz, or every
54.9254 milliseconds. This means that the tick width is roughly 55 ms. We have
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currently chosen the clock frame (the value of PER) to be 10 seconds, or 182 timer ticks.
This is a free parameter of the algorithm, and it may be varied according to the needs of
the system user.
We shall now calculate the various parameters of the synchronization algorithm
from Section 4.2. The first parameter is PER.
isec
PER = 182ticks = 9.996sec. (5.1)
18.2065ticks
We now move to determining the value of dmin. The synchronization interval is the
longest possible length of time between starting the new clock on the first processor to
resynchronize and starting the new clock on the third processor to resynchronize. We
calculate this time with the help of Figure 5.7.
begk Timer Interrupt endk
Sign/Send
Verify | Sign/Send
Verify
26ms 55ms 26ms 55ms
Worst-case Synchronization Interval: 162ms
Figure 5.7: Calculation of dmin.
Results from benchmarking of the synchronization overhead (tabulated in Chapter 6),
indicate that the algorithm never utilizes more than 26 ms to sign and send a
synchronization message. A synchronization round begins with the first channel taking
26 ms to sign and transmit a synchronization message. Since we are interested in the
worst-case, we assume that this message arrives on the middle channel just after a timer
interrupt. This introduces a wait of no more than 55 ms until the middle channel
processes this message. The middle channel then uses another 26 ms to sign and relay
the message to the last channel. If the relayed message also arrives just after a timer
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interrupt, the last channel will need to wait another 55 ms to update its virtual clock, thus
completing the resynchronization of all channels. This gives a result of
d min = 26 + 55 + 26 + 55 = 162ms. (5.2)
Knowing the time between successive synchronizations (PER) and the length of
the synchronization interval (dmin), we can now calculate the maximum Newtonian
deviation between any two correct virtual clocks (DMAX). Eliminating the variable dr
from equations 4.7 and 4.15, we obtain
DMAX = (1 + p)d min+ p(2 + p)PER. (5.3)
Typical oscillators have p = 10-4. Substituting this value and the predetermined values of
dmin and PER results in the following:
DMAX = (1 + 10-4)(0.162) + (10-4)(2 + 10-4)(9.996) = 0.1640sec. (5.4)
For purposes of implementing the algorithm, we must determine the value of D. We
measure must this in terms of timer ticks:
18.2065ticksD 0. 1640 sec = 2.986ticks. (5.5)
sec
In the Beetle system, the "least-significant bit" of measurable time is one tick, so the
value of D we use in the Message Manager Task is three ticks. This means that
D = 3ticks 9254ms164.8ms, (5.6)
tick
and satisfies the Drift Inequality of Equation 4.13, since 164.8ms > 164.0ms.
Recalling that f = 1 for a l-Byzantine-Resilient system, we now show that this
value of D also meets the condition of Interval Separation (Equation 4.14):
PER > 162ms (1 + 10-4) + (1)(164.8ms) = 326.8ms. (5.7)
Since PER is equal to 10 seconds, we satisfy this constraint easily.
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The last value to calculate is ADJ, the maximum amount by which a correct
processor must adjust its virtual clock in any given synchronization. We do this by
making the appropriate substitutions in Equation 4.16:
ADJ = (1 + 1)(164.8ms) = 329.6ms. (5.8)
We conclude this section by summarizing the parameters of the synchronization
algorithm in Table 5.1. In Chapter 6, we discuss the performance of the algorithm for
various synchronization frequencies.
Parameter Value
PER 182 ticks = 9.996 sec
dmin 162.0 ms
DMAX 164.0 ms
D 3 ticks = 164.8 ms
ADJ 329.6 ms
Table 5.1: Parameters of the Synchronization Algorithm.
5.5 Voting
5.5.1 The Beetle Voting Function
To implement the voting process, we create and initialize a series of buffers on
each Beetle channel. Figure 5.8 contains a diagram of the voting process showing the
appropriate use of these buffers.
Within any application process running on the Beetle, there are two buffers on
each channel which are dedicated to the voting algorithm. The first is the source buffer,
from which the voting process takes the output of the host task to use as an input to the
choice function. The second is the destination buffer, where the voting process places the
result of the vote at the termination of the voting function. There are also three
intermediate buffers, which store the host value and the two received values to be used as
inputs to the choice function. We have implemented the choice function as a simple
majority determination. The voting function compares the three intermediate values with
each other, and if one is incorrect the other two values carry the vote.
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Figure 5.8: Implementation of Beetle Voting Process.
The steps a processor must follow in order to perform a vote are the following:
1) Retrieve output from the source buffer.
2) Prepare and send a message containing the output value to each of the other
processors in the system.
3) Wait until the intermediate vote buffers each contain a value.
4) Execute the choice function, and place the result in the destination buffer.
These steps are all relatively straightforward to implement, with the exception of step
three. This step deserves further discussion.
We have settled upon a timeout method of waiting for vote messages. When a
processor finishes sending its vote message, it simply waits for a long time. By the end
of this wait, the processor should certainly have received a vote message from both
neighbors. If a message has not arrived from either direction, the processor may safely
assume the existence of a error in message transmission or processing and proceed
accordingly. We determine the value for this timeout by examining Equation 5.3, which
shows that the maximum skew between virtual clocks in the current implementation is
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164 ms. We have settled on 180 ms, which is comfortably larger than this maximum
skew.
5.5.2 Prototype Application
We have not yet implemented a typical user application on the Beetle system.
Instead, the prototype currently performs an artificial vote scheduled by the virtual clocks
on each channel, employing the choice function of the voting algorithm. The actual
information that the Beetle votes is a series of four 32-bit numbers which result from the
following test computation. The artificial application seeds the random number generator
on each channel with the same value. The computation then generates a random number
n, and computes the values of n2 , n3 , and n4 , all modulo 232. The Beetle votes the
number itself and the three calculated values, with the four resultant numbers appearing
on the monitor for each channel.
5.6 Interactive Consistency
We have not yet integrated the interactive consistency exchange framework
selected for use in the Beetle system. We do achieve interactive consistency in the test
computation described in the previous subsection. The necessary condition is that the
input data be bitwise identical on each of the channels. Since the application uses the
same numerical seed across each of the channels, this condition is satisfied. The current
prototype processes no sensor data.
66
6. Performance
6.1 Clock Synchronization
6.1.1 Overview
In order to calculate the performance overhead of the clock synchronization
algorithm, we must determine the worst-case synchronization time for an individual
processor. That is, with what set of conditions will a processor need to spend the
maximum amount of processing time upon tasks involved with synchronization? Once
we determined this, we divided the overall process of synchronization into multiple
discrete steps, and examined and measured each step individually. When we completed
this, a simple summation gave us the desired performance penalty due to synchronization.
The method of measurement involved the use of a Biomation logic analyzer
running Configurable Logic Analysis Software (CLAS). We inserted instructions which
sent specified "code" numbers to the parallel ports on each processor board at key points
within the software that implements the Beetle system, in order to signal the execution of
various portions of code. We then monitored, recorded, and measured the duration of
these code numbers with the logic analyzer. The need to capture an entire
synchronization interval in a single pass limited the resolution of the logic analyzer to 10
microseconds.
6.1.2 Measurements
By closely examining the operation of the synchronization algorithm, we can
determine the worst-case situation for any processor. During a synchronization,
processors spend their time sending and receiving messages. So a natural place to begin
is determining the maximum number of messages a processor can possibly send and
receive in any one synchronization.
Let us consider the two tasks of the algorithm. In the case that the local virtual
clock triggers task Time Monitor to send messages, the host processor will need to send a
message to both of its neighbors. In the case that an arriving message triggers task
Message Manager, the host processor will need to relay that one message. When a
processor receives and processes a synchronization message, it resynchronizes by
updating its virtual clock. Once a processor has executed this step, it will not process any
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more messages for that synchronization; it will simply discard any further such messages
that it might receive. The maximum number of times that task MSG can be triggered in a
single synchronization is therefore equal to one. The worst-case for sending messages is
then the execution of task TM, when a processor must simultaneously send one message
to each neighbor.
We must also determine the maximum of messages that a processor will ever
receive and process in any given synchronization. As we mentioned, when a processor
updates its virtual clock it proceeds to ignore any further synchronization messages. So a
processor will receive at most one message from each neighbor in a particular
synchronization. Under certain conditions, a processor may receive messages from both
neighbors relatively close together and will therefore process both messages. When the
next timer tick interrupt occurs and the system checks for arrived messages, task MSG
will see both messages and start a new clock frame. We conclude that the worst-case for
receiving and processing message is exactly one message arising from each neighboring
processor.
There is one more task which consumes time in the process of maintaining
synchrony among the Beetle processors. A processor adds one tick to its virtual clock
every time the timer tick interrupt occurs, and spends a certain amount of time handling
each interrupt. We must measure exactly how long this takes. We summarize the tasks a
processor must perform in the worst-case synchronization:
1) Receive and process one synchronization message from first neighbor.
2) Receive and process one synchronization message from second neighbor.
3) Assemble and concurrently send a synchronization message to each neighbor.
4) Service PER timer tick interrupts.
First we will calculate how much time a processor requires to receive two
messages. We gathered data using the logic analyzer as mentioned previously, and
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 display these numbers.
To comprehend this data, one must understand the nature of the receiving process.
A synchronization message consists of 49 bytes of information. A byte arriving over the
serial port triggers a received byte interrupt, and the interrupt service routine (ISR)
associated with that interrupt is then responsible for reading the byte and placing it in a
buffer. Ideally, it takes the processor the same amount of time to accomplish this for each
byte. For 46 of these bytes, that is exactly what happens (with a slight amount of
variation). However, for three of the received bytes, additional processing occurs within
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the ISR. This processing has to do with determining message size, message type, and
verifying the signature. So the values for these three bytes should be treated individually,
and the other 46 may be treated as a group.
Phase of Receiving
(number of bytes involved)
Normal Bytes (46)
Message Size (1)
Message Type (1)
Message Authentication (1)
Total Sync Message
Table 6.1: Data for Receiving
Time Spent Receiving
From Left Neighbor
62. 26us *46 = 2.864ms
72.00 us
73.00 us
467.00 us
3.48 ms
a Synchronization Message from
Percent
of Total
82.4
2.1
2.1
13.4
100.0
Left Neighbor.
Phase of Receiving
(number of bytes involved)
Normal Bytes (46)
Message Size (1)
Message Type (1)
Message Authentication (1)
Total Sync Message
Time Spent Receiving
From Right Neighbor
20.33us- 46 = 935.18us
30.00 us
30.00 us
420.00 us
1.42 ms
Table 6.2: Data for Receiving a Synchronization Message from Right Neighbor.
In our discussion of these results, we distinguish the two neighbors of a processor
as the "left" and "right" neighbors. We make this distinction arbitrarily, but we must in
some fashion differentiate these two processors since the overhead is dependent upon
which direction a processor is sending a message. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the
relationships between the each processor in the Beetle prototype and its left and right
neighbors.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give the specific phases of message transmission and receipt
that we measured, along with the average amount of time spent accomplishing each task.
We then sum these values to find the amount of total time used to receive a full
synchronization message from each direction. These numbers are very different for the
left direction as opposed to the right direction for hardware specific reasons. On the
particular processor boards used in the prototype implementation, the serial port used for
sending to and receiving from the right is an IBM-PC compatible RS-232 port. However,
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Percent
of Total
66.1
2.1
2.1
29.7
100.0 i
the port used for communicating with the left neighbor is a non-standard serial port and is
accessed through the Binary Input/Output System (BIOS) of the computer in a different
manner. Due to this hardware variance, the access times for the two ports are not
comparable.
L: Left Neighbor
R: Right Neighbor
Figure 6.1: Topology of the Beetle Prototype.
We now consider the overhead associated with simultaneously sending a
synchronization message to each neighbor. We divided this overhead into two distinctly
measurable phases. The first phase is assembly of the message, which involves tasks
such as filling the appropriate header, data, and trailer fields and generating the signature.
The second phase is actually sending the message to both of the neighboring processors.
Table 6.3 gives the results of this data acquisition.
Phase of Sending
Message Assembly
Message Transfer
Total Sync Message
Time Spent
183.00 us
25.11 ms
25.29 ms
Table 6.3: Data for Sending a Synchronization Message.
There is one other segment of time associated with synchronization which also
contributes to the overhead. This is the time spent handling the timer interrupts generated
every 55 ms which each channel uses to update the virtual clocks. In each clock frame
PER of these occur, which in the current implementation is equal to 182.
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% of Total
0.7
99.3
100.0
As with the ISR for receiving bytes, the ISR for timer tick interrupts sometimes
performs different tasks in different calls. In any one clock frame, there are two cases in
which calling the ISR clears the receiving buffers to remove the effect of any possible
stray characters. There also may be one call in which the ISR realizes it is time to send a
synchronization message, and therefore executes certain extra instructions. Every other
time that the ISR is called, it executes exactly the same instructions. We will consider the
case in which a processor initiates a synchronization, since that will incur a marginally
greater overhead than a processor which synchronizes due to a received message. In the
current implementation of PER equal to 182 ticks, with three special ISR calls, 179 calls
of the ISR are identical. Table 6.4 contains the timer tick ISR data.
Type of Timer Tick ISR Task
(number of occurrences per frame)
Simple Increment of Tick Counter (179)
Reset Receive Buffers (2)
Initiate Synchronization Message (1)
Total Timer ISR Time
Time Spent Handling
One Occurrence
13. 00us 179 = 2.327ms
179.50us. 2 = 359.00us
15.50 us I
2.70 ms
Percent
of Total
86.1
13.3
0.6
100.0
Table 6.4: Data for Handling Timer Tick Interrupts.
Using all of this data, we can now calculate the overhead for the synchronization
algorithm. Table 6.5 summarizes the data for the synchronization overhead.
Phase of Synchronization
1) Receive Message from Left Neighbor
2) Receive Message from Right Neighbor
3) Send Synchronization Messages
4) Handling Timer Tick Interrupts
Total Synchronization Overhead
Time Spent
3.48 ms
1.42 ms
25.29 ms
2.70 ms
32.89 ms
Table 6.5: Total Synchronization Overhead.
Note that the majority of the synchronization overhead is due to sending messages. We
will make a recommendation for dissolving this bottleneck in Section 6.4.2. For the
current synchronization period of 10 seconds, we calculate that the
Beetle Synchronization Overhead=Total Sync Time 32.89ms = 0.33%. (6.1)
PER 10sec
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% of Total
10.6
4.3
76.9
8.2
100.0
6.1.3 Projections for Different Synchronization Periods
As the parameter PER varies, the performance of the synchronization algorithm
changes accordingly. Let us consider the cases where PER equals one second and 100
seconds. To actually implement these periods, we would have to use PER equal to 18
ticks and 1820 ticks, respectively, which give actual values of
lsec
PERsec = 18ticks sec = 0.9887sec
18.2065ticks
PER00s = 1820ticks = 99.96sec.
18.2065ticks
(6.2)
(6.3)
The corresponding values of DMAX are
DMAXPER=lsec = (1 + 10-4)(0.162) + (10-4 )(2 + 10 - 4 )(0.9887) = 0.1622sec
DMAXPER=10sec = (1 + 10- 4 )(0.162) + (10- 4 )(2 + 10 - 4 )(99.96) = 0. 1820sec.
These values convert to timer ticks as follows:
18. 2065ticksDMAXpERls 2 0. 1622 sec. = 2.95ticks
sec
and
18.2065ticks
DMAXER=lOOsec > 0. 1820 sec. = 3.3 lticks.
sec
(6.4)
(6.5)
(6.6)
(6.7)
These calculations allow us to determine that D must equal three ticks and four ticks for
PER equal to one second and 10 seconds, respectively.
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and
and
The total time spent on synchronization overhead also changes as PER increases.
This is due to the different number of timer interrupts which the processor must service.
Each interval, regardless of its length, executes three special calls of the ISR as we
discussed earlier and demonstrated in Table 6.4. Two buffer reset calls each require
179.5 us, and initiating a synchronization message requires 15.5 us. For PER equal to
one second, there are 18 - 3 = 15 routine calls of the ISR which merely update the tick
counter. For PER equal to 100 seconds, there are 1821- 3 = 1818 such calls of the ISR.
Each routine call requires 13 us to execute. The time spent handling timer tick interrupts
for these values of PER are
T(ISR)pER=s: = (15- 13us)+ 374.5us = 569.5us (6.8)
and
T(ISR)pER=100s. = (1818* 13us) + 374.5us = 24.Olms. (6.9)
These values then sum with the 30.19 ms required to perform phases 1, 2, and 3 of
synchronization to give totals of 30.76 ms and 54.20 ms for PER equal to one second and
100 seconds, respectively.
Table 6.6 summarizes the tradeoffs necessary when one attempts to keep both the
maximum clock skew (DMAX) and synchronization overhead in a reasonable range.
Note that a lower bound exists on the possible choices for PER. In order to satisfy
Interval Separation (Equation 4.14) for the current value of dmin, PER must be greater
than about 330 ms. We calculated this threshold in Equation 5.7.
As we substantially increase the time between successive synchronizations (PER),
we notice four significant results. One result is that the maximum skew possible between
the virtual clocks on two different processors does not increase very rapidly at all. In
fact, as we increase PER by two orders of magnitude, from one second to 100, DMAX
182.Oms - 162.2msincreases by a mere = 12%. In Beetle time, this is an increase of
162.2ms
only a single timer tick. Figure 6.2 graphically expresses the relationship between the
maximum inter-channel clock skew and the time between synchronizations.
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PER PER PER DMAX DMAX D Max Overhead
(intended (actual (actual Sync (% of
sec) ticks) sec) (ms) (ticks) (ticks) Time PER)
0.5 9 0.4943 162.1 2.95 3 30.64 ms 6.20 %
1 18 0.9887 162.2 2.95 3 30.76 ms 3.11 %
3 55 3.021 162.6 2.96 3 31.24 ms 1.04 %
5 91 4.998 163.0 2.97 3 31.71 ms 0.634 %
10 182 9.996 164.0 2.99 3 32.89 ms 0.329 %
30 546 29.99 168.0 3.05 4 37.62 ms 0.125 %
50 910 49.98 172.0 3.13 4 42.36 ms 0.0847 %
100 1821 100.02 182.0 3.31 4 54.20 ms 0.0541 %
Table 6.6: DMAX and Synchronization Overhead vs. PER.
DMAX vs. PER
1 3
180
Cn 175
170
165
160
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
PER (sec)
Figure 6.2: Plot of DMAX vs. PER.
This relationship is linear, as dictated by Equation 5.3. In fact, we used that very
equation to calculate all of the maximum skew values in Table 6.6. We can determine the
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equation governing this relationship by simplifying Equation 5.3 through the use of
approximations. First, we replicate the expression for maximum clock skew:
DMAX = (1 + p)d min+ p(2 + p)PER. (6.10)
Recalling that p = 10- 4 and noticing that 10- 4 << 1 and 10- 4 << 2, we can discard
dominated terms to determine that
DMAX = dmin+ 2pPER. (6.11)
Substituting known values for dmin and p, we conclude that with DMAX measured in
milliseconds and PER measured in seconds the following relationship holds:
DMAX = 162 + -PER. (6.12)
5
The second major result from Table 6.6 is that as the time between
synchronizations increases, the percentage of processor time required to perform a
resynchronization drops off quite quickly. As PER increases by two orders of magnitude,
from one second to 100, the overhead as a percentage of PER decreases by a factor of
3.11%
= 57. This indicates that there is very little penalty associated with decreasing
0.0541%
the time between synchronizations, and that the overhead can be made almost negligible
with an appropriate choice of PER. Figure 6.3 graphically expresses the inverse
relationship between the synchronization overhead percentage and the amount of time
between successive synchronizations.
We can also make a tradeoff between restricting synchronization overhead and
limiting DMAX. Figure 6.4 graphically expresses the relationship between
synchronization overhead and maximum inter-channel clock skew. This graph shows
that reducing DMAX below 165 ms or so has a very noticeable effect on the amount of
synchronization overhead required by the system.
As a final. result, we discover that there is a definite limit to the frequency of
synchronization for the current implementation of the Beetle system. To alter the
conditions imposed by Interval Separation, it will be necessary to decrease the value of
dmin. This will require faster transmission of synchronization messages, which in turn
will require faster communication links. We consider this topic in Section 6.4.
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Figure 6.3: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. PER.
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Figure 6.4: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. DMAX.
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6.2 Voting
6.2.1 Overview
We measured the amount of voting overhead in the same manner in which we
measured the synchronization overhead. Namely, we wrote certain numbers to the
parallel ports at certain times and used the CLAS system to monitor these values, in
order to determine the execution time for various sections of code.
6.2.2 Measurements
Unlike the synchronization process, the voting process requires the same number
of messages sent and received by each processor for each round. There is therefore no
need to determine the worst-case number of messages. We have divided the tasks
involved in the voting process into four separate stages to facilitate benchmarking. These
four phases are the following, which begin once the calculation is completed:
1) Prepare the vote message.
2) Send the vote message.
3) Receive vote messages from the other two channels and verify their signatures.
4) Wait for the other two messages to arrive and then execute the choice function.
The overhead we measured for preparing the vote message (phase 1) containing
the results of the calculations from Section 5.5.2 averages 2.23 ms. When a processor
transmits a message (phase 2), it spends 31.38 ms sending characters and waiting for the
serial ports to be ready for the next character. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 give the data for the
amount of time the two receiving processors spend in bringing in and authenticating the
average vote message from each direction (phase 3). Note that these tables use the same
conventions in distinguishing left and right processors as did the tables for
synchronization messages (Tables 6.1 and 6.2).
The last contributor to the voting overhead is the timeout period and the execution
of the choice function (phase 4). Our tests indicate that on average a receiving processor
takes 182.1 ms to perform these functions. This is for PER equal to 10 seconds and a
timeout of 180 ms. Table 6.9 summarizes the data for voting overhead.
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Phase of Receiving Time Spent Receiving Percent
(number of bytes involved) From Left Neighbor of Total
Normal Bytes (58) 61.91us 58 = 3.591ms 85.8
Message Size (1) 70.00 us 1.7
Message Type (1) 72.00 us 1.7
Message Authentication (1) 452.00 us 10.8
Total Vote Message 4.18 ms 100.0
Table 6.7: Data for Receiving a Vote Message from Left Neighbor.
Phase of Receiving
(number of bytes involved)
Normal Bytes (58)
Message Size (1)
Message Type (1)
Message Authentication (1)
Total Vote Message
Time Spent Receiving
From Right Neighbor
20.16us. 58 = 1.169ms
30.00 us
33.00 us
404.00 us
1.64 ms
Table 6.8: Data for Receiving a Vote Message from Right Neighbor.
Phase of Voting
1) Message Assembly
2) Message Transmission
3) Receiving and Processing Two Vote Messages
4) Timeout and Choice Function
Total Voting Overhead
Time Spent
2.23 ms
31.38 ms
5.82 ms
182.1 ms
221 .53 ms
Table 6.9: Total Voting Overhead.
Note that the majority of the voting overhead is due to the lengthy timeout waiting for
messages from other processors. We make a recommendation for removing this
bottleneck in Section 6.4.2.
We can now calculate the total voting overhead as a percentage of total processor
time. The prototype is currently running a single vote during each clock frame; that is,
once every 10 seconds. This allows us to determine that the
Total Vote Time 221.53msBeetle Voting Overhead= t= - ^ = 2.22%.C) -- -~~~~,,,FIK Iosec
(6.13)
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Percent
of Total
71.5
1.8
2.0
24.7
100.0
% of Total
1.0
14.2
2.6
82.2
100.0
6.2.3 Comparison of Synchronization and Voting Results
The only difference between the synchronization and vote messages is in the
length of the message. The header and trailer are the same for each message, but the vote
message contains 16 bytes of data while the synchronization message contains four. Any
particular byte should, on average, take the same amount of time to transmit as any other
byte (in the same direction, using the same serial port). We can check this belief by
examining the "time to receive byte from [left/right] neighbor" data for normal bytes
from Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.7, and 6.8. For the left neighbor, these tables give 62.26 and
61.91 ms, respectively. For the right neighbor, these tables give 20.33 and 20.16 ms. We
can assume that these values would correspond even more closely with a larger sample
size.
6.3 Overall Performance
We now discuss the overall performance of the Beetle system. The combined
amount of overhead for the synchronization and voting fault-tolerance routines is
32.89 + 221.53 = 254.42ms. (6.14)
For PER equal to 10 seconds, we calculate that the
Total FT Time 254.42ms
Beetle Fault-Tolerance Overhead= FT Time 2.54% (6.15)
PER 10sec
of the total processing time available to each channel. When compared with the results
from other fault-tolerant systems mentioned in Chapter 2, this figure stands up very
favorably. Of course, there are more routines that we must implement, most notably an
interactive consistency exchange mechanism, before we can determine a definitive
overhead figure for the Beetle. Also, if the system performs more calculations and
therefore more votes in a clock frame, the overhead will increase. In measuring the
voting overhead, we have not counted the actual calculation time, since that occurs on a
simplex machine in any event.
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6.4 Projections for Improved Performance
6.4.1 Synchronization Projections
Our goal in this section is to explore what effects altering some of the hardware
components of the Beetle system would have upon the synchronization overhead.
Namely, if the Beetle were based upon faster processors or utilized faster communication
links, by how much would the synchronization overhead decrease? For all of our
projections, we keep the value of PER constant at 10 seconds.
We first investigate the effects of increasing the processor speed. The phases of
synchronization directly affected by processor speed are phases 1, 2, and 4: receiving
messages from the left and right and handling timer tick interrupts. We make the
assumption that increasing the processor speed by a factor of n translates into a reduction
in processing time by a factor of n. Table 6.10 displays and Figure 6.5 graphically
expresses our projections for increased processor speed.
Processor Receiving Transmit Timer Total Sync Total Sync
Speed ISRs Sync Msg ISR Overhead Overhead
(x Current) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (% of PER)
lx 4.90 25.29 2.70 32.89 0.329 %
10x 0.49 25.29 0.27 26.05 0.261 %
100x 0.049 25.29 0.027 25.37 0.254 %
Table 6.10: Projections for Increased Processor Speed.
Next we investigate the effects of increasing the speed of the inter-processor
communication links. The phase of synchronization directly affected by the speed of the
communication links is phase 3: sending a synchronization message. Before proceeding
with our projections, we must justify treating the time spent on this phase as dominated
by the speed of the communication links. Remember that our links are operating at
19,200 bits per second, with no parity, eight data bits, and one stop bit. Therefore this
communication protocol requires 10 bits, including a start bit, to transmit a single byte of
information. We calculate the time required to transmit a 49 byte synchronization
message to be
10bits sec49bytes =25.5ms. (6.16)
byte 19,200bits
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Allowing for slight variation due to imperfect measurements, this agrees completely with
our measured value of 25.3 ms. Therefore we are justified in assuming that the speed of
the communication links dominates the time spent on phase 3 of synchronization.
Synchronization Overhead vs. Processor Speed
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Figure 6.5: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. Processor Speed
for Current Communication Link Speed.
We also make the assumption that increasing the speed of the communication
links by a factor of n translates into a reduction in sending time by a factor of n. Table
6.11 gives the results of these projections.
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Speed of Receiving Transmit Timer Total Sync Total Sync
Comm Link ISRs Sync Msg ISR Overhead Overhead
(x Current) (ms) (ms)s) (is) (ms) (% of PER)
lx 4.90 25.29 2.70 32.89 0.329 %
10x 4.90 2.529 2.70 10.13 0.101 %
100x 4.90 0.2529 2.70 7.85 0.0785 %
100l x 4.90 0.0253 2.70 7.63 0.0763 %
Table 6.11: Projections for Increased Communication Link Speed.
Figure 6.6 graphically expresses our projections for increased communication link speed.
Synchronization Overhead vs. Communication Link Speed
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Figure 6.6: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. Communication Link Speed
for Current Processor Speed.
We now investigate the effects of simultaneously increasing the processor speed
and the speed of the communication links in various combinations. Table 6.12 gives the
results of our projections.
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Sync Overhead Processor
(% of PER) Seeds x x 100x
lx 0.329 % 0.261 % 0.254 %
Communication 10x 0.101 % 0.0329 % 0.0261 %
Links 100x 0.0785 % 0.0101 % 0.0033 %
1000x 0.0763 % 0.0079 % 0.0010 %
Table 6.12: Projections for Increased Processor and Communication Link Speed.
Figure 6.7 graphically expresses our projections for simultaneous increases in processor
speed and speed of communication links.
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Figure 6.7: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. Communication Link Speed
for Various Processor Speeds.
Note that once we increase the processor and communication link speeds to 10 times the
current rates, further increases bring only marginal improvement in performance. This
result brings us to a recommendation for improving the Beetle hardware, in terms of
currently available technology.
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----- Processor lx
.... ........ Processor 10x
---- 0 ---- Processor 100x
The prototype Beetle processor is an Intel 80386 running at 25 MHz. An upgrade
to a modem RISC processor could boost the processing speed by a factor of 10 or more.
The current RS-232 communication link technology could be replaced by high speed
ethernet, resulting in a performance improvement of at least a factor of 100. We shall
refer to this point design of a 10x faster processor and 100x faster communication links in
later discussions.
We now consider the effects of increasing the frequency of the timer ticks. For
example, increasing the frequency by a factor of 10 means that interrupts occur at
182.065 Hz, or every 5.4925 ms. Every occurrence of these more frequent interrupts still
requires a call of the Timer ISR, so the overhead will increase. Table 6.13 gives the
results of our projections on the current Beetle hardware.
Timer Int Receiving Transmit Timer Total Sync Total Sync
Frequency ISRs Sync Msg ISR Overhead Overhead
(x Current) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (% of PER)
Ix 4.90 25.29 2.70 32.89 0.329 %
10x 4.90 25.29 24.01 54.20 0.542 %
100x 4.90 25.29 237.01 267.20 2.67 %
Table 6.13: Projections for Increased Timer Interrupt Frequency
for the Current Beetle System.
We also make projections for increased timer interrupt frequency for a Beetle system
implemented more on the more powerful hardware we mentioned earlier: a 10x faster
processor and 100x faster communication links. Table 6.14 contains these projections.
Timer Int Receiving Transmit Timer Total Sync Total Sync
Frequency ISRs Sync Msg ISR Overhead Overhead
(x Current) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (% of PER)
lx 0.49 0.253 0.27 1.01 0.0101 %
10x 0.49 0.253 2.40 3.14 0.0314 %
100x 0.49 0.253 23.70 24.44 0.244 %
Table 6.14: Projections for Increased Timer Interrupt Frequency
for a Faster Beetle System.
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Figure 6.8 graphically expresses our projections for increased timer interrupt frequency
for both the current and faster Beetle systems.
Synchronization Overhead vs. Timer Interrupt Frequency
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Figure 6.8: Plot of Synchronization Overhead vs. Timer Interrupt Frequency.
6.4.2 Improved Beetle Design
Our study of more powerful hardware and a careful examination of bottlenecks in
the synchronization and voting processes prompt us to define an improved Beetle system
which would have a drastically lower fault-tolerance overhead than the current prototype.
However, this improved Beetle system is attainable with the computer technology of the
present day.
The first improvement is to upgrade the hardware as we determined in the
previous section. It is a simple matter to increase the processor speed by a factor of 10
and the speed of the inter-channel communication links by a factor of 100.
Secondly, accomplishing useful work during the timeout would bring about a
welcome improvement in the performance of the voting process. If the Beetle system
were to schedule task processing during this time then the largest single contributor
(82%) to voting overhead would be removed.
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A third modification which would substantially decrease the fault-tolerance
overhead has to do with the manner in which Beetle processors send synchronization and
voting messages. Currently the sending is "in-line," meaning that the sending function
monopolizes the processor for the purpose of sending a message or messages. With this
implementation, the processor can tend to no other tasks while sending messages. It must
waste a large amount of time waiting for the serial ports to accept the next byte.
We can handle this sending of messages in other ways. One method which would
lend itself nicely to the Beetle system is interrupt driven sending. The receipt of bytes
over the serial ports is already interrupt driven. It would not be too much of a stretch to
implement such a technique for sending bytes as well. How much time would interrupt
driven sending use? To answer this question, let us examine the receiving and sending
processes. When a byte arrives at the serial port and is received by the universal
asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART), the Beetle executes the following steps:
1) The UART triggers the receive byte interrupt.
2) The processor calls the receive byte ISR.
3) The processor reads the byte from the UART.
4) The processor writes the byte into a buffer in main memory.
5) The processor exits from the receive byte ISR.
Interrupt driven sending consists of the following steps:
1) When the UART finishes sending a byte, it triggers the send byte interrupt.
2) The processor calls the send byte ISR.
3) The processor reads the next byte from a buffer in main memory.
4) The processor writes the next byte to UART.
5) The processor exits from the send byte ISR.
We assume that main memory reads and writes consume equal amounts of time, and that
UART reads and writes take equal amounts of time. This means that interrupt driven
sending will consume the same amount of time as interrupt driven receiving. We shall
use this fact in the next section as we make quantitative projections about interrupt driven
sending.
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6.4.3 Voting Projections
We shall make projections for the voting process for two types of Beetle systems.
One is the Beetle prototype as it is currently implemented, and the other is the improved
version described in Section 6.4.2. For both systems we will determine how the voting
overhead changes as the amount of data voted increases, while keeping the value of PER
constant at 10 seconds.
First let us calculate the increase in overhead for more bytes of data being voted
on the current Beetle system. Table 6.15 contains these projections.
Number Message Transmit Receive Timeout/ Total Vote Total Vote
of Bytes Assembly Vote Msg Message Choice Overhead Overhead
Voted (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (% of PER)
16 2.23 31.38 5.82 182.1 221.53 2.22 %
32 2.81 39.61 7.35 182.65 232.42 2.32 %
64 3.98 56.07 10.40 183.75 254.21 2.54 %
128 6.32 89.00 16.51 185.96 297.78 2.98 %
Table 6.15: Projections for Voting Overhead vs. Number of Bytes Voted
for the Current Beetle System.
Now we calculate the increase in overhead for more bytes of data being voted on the
improved Beetle system. Table 6.16 contains these projections.
Number Message Transmit Receive Choice Total Vote Total Vote
of Bytes Assembly Vote Msg Message Function Overhead Overhead
Voted (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (ms) (% of PER)
16 0.223 0.582 0.582 0.210 1.60 0.0160 %
32 0.281 0.735 0.735 0.265 2.02 0.0202 %
64 0.398 1.04 1.04 0.375 2.85 0.0285 %
128 0.632 1.65 1.65 0.596 4.53 0.0453 %
Table 6.16: Projections for Voting Overhead vs. Number of Bytes Voted
for the Improved Beetle System.
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Note that now the voting overhead is fairly well spread out across the four phases of
voting; there is no particular bottleneck. Figure 6.9 graphically expresses our projections
for increased voting overhead as a function of number of bytes voted.
Voting Overhead vs. Number of Bytes Voted
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Figure 6.9: Voting Overhead vs. Number of Bytes Voted.
The overhead for the current Beetle system dwarfs the overhead for the improved version
of the Beetle system. However, the percentage increases in overhead due to an increasing
number of bytes being voted are larger for the improved Beetle system.
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7. Conclusions
7.1 Results
The fault-tolerance overhead we have measured for the Beetle synchronization
and voting processes is very promising. Compared to previous systems like SIFT,
FTMP, and MAFT, the early results for the Beetle system are better by at least an order
of magnitude, although the Beetle operates for a 0.1 Hz iteration rate. We must caution
that we have not integrated all of the necessary algorithms into the Beetle environment
and therefore the overhead will increase beyond the numbers we have so far measured.
We must still implement an interactive consistency exchange routine, but the overhead
for this process should generally be on the order of the results for the voting algorithm.
7.2 Directions for Future Development
Some rather simple revisions can significantly decrease the overhead of the
existing synchronization and voting algorithms. In Section 6.4.2, we have described an
improved design for the Beetle system which takes advantages of these revisions. Two of
these improvements are the scheduling of tasks during the voting timeout and
implementing interrupt driven message sending.
We have also investigated the improved performance of the Beetle with faster
hardware. In Section 6.4.1, we provide some projections for the synchronization
overhead for the Beetle when implemented with faster microprocessors and faster inter-
channel communication links. In Section 6.4.2, we recommend a point design which is
easily attainable with current levels of technology. This design involves upgrading the
Beetle processors by a factor of 10 and increasing the speed of the communication links
by a factor of 100. These upgrades provide an improvement in performance of over two
orders of magnitude (Section 6.4.3). Our projections also indicate that further
investments in more powerful hardware will bring rather small additional performance
improvements, and are most likely not worthwhile from a cost perspective.
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Appendix A: The Beetle Development System
A.1 Overview
The development system for the Beetle project consists of a Compaq 386/33 personal
computer and the Beetle I prototype itself. The prototype consists of three commercial
i386-based processor boards and the associated communication links. The Compaq
machine runs Borland Turbo C++ 4.0, the language in which we have written all of the
Beetle I software. We generate and compile the source code on the Compaq machine.
Then we download the executable files to one of the channels on the prototype over an
RS-232 serial link, using Borland's Turbo Debugging Remote file transfer routine. The
final step involves distributing the files to the other two channels over other RS-232 serial
links, using a file transfer utility specifically written for this project. Each of the three
channels on the prototype has a dedicated keyboard and VGA monitor for input and
output.
A.2 Code Development on the Compaq
We edit files using the MS-DOS text editor. A sample of invoking the editor on a file
named "sync.c" follows:
E:\> edit sync.c
Following this, we can edit the source code in any manner we desire. The editor
saves files as simple DOS text files.
A makefile controls the compilation of the source code. A partial listing of a
representative makefile follows:
CC = BCC
INC = 8250dual.h 8254.h comm.h timing.h message.h globals.h
chana.exe : chana.c confa.c msgsend.c auth.c msgbuf.c isr.c compute.c disp.c $(INC)
$(CC) -v chana.c confa.c msgsend.c auth.c msgbuf.c isr.c compute.c disp.c
91
The following is an example of invoking the make command:
E:\> make chana.exe
The following text will appear on the screen:
MAKE Version 3.7 Copyright (c) 1987, 1993 Borland International
BCC -v chana.c confa.c msgsend.c auth.c msgbuf.c isr.c compute.c disp.c
Borland C++ Version 4.00 Copyright (c) 1993 Borland International
chana.c:
confa.c:
msgsend.c:
auth.c:
msgbuf.c:
isr.c:
compute.c:
disp.c:
Turbo Link Version 6.00 Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 Borland International
The files following the colon in the listing for chana.exe in the makefile comprise the
dependency list for chana.exe. When the developer issues a make command, the
compiler checks to see if any of these files have changed since the compiler last built
chana.exe. If so, the compiler will rebuild chana.exe. If the developer has not modified
any of these files, then the compiler will not needlessly rebuild chana.exe. The CC
instance determines which C Compiler to use, in this case the Borland C Compiler. The
INC instance is a shorthand for inserting a string of header files into the dependency list
for multiple files. The files listed on the line after the $(CC) are the source code files that
the compiler actually compiles and links into the object file once the C compiler has
determined that it must rebuild chana.exe.
A.3 Downloading Files from the Compaq to Beetle
Once we have created the executable files, we use the Turbo Debugger Remote
download utility to transfer the files to Beetle I. A sample invocation of this utility
follows:
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Compaq:
E:\> tdrf copy chana.exe
Beetle I:
C:\> tdremote
The following information will appear on the screens:
Compaq:
Waiting for handshake from remote driver (press Ctrl-Break to quit)
Copying "chana.exe" to "chana.exe" on remote
Beetle I:
TD Remote Program Loader Version 4.0 Copyright (c) 1988, 1992 Borland Intl
Waiting for handshake (press Ctrl-Break to quit)
Link established
Reading file "chana.exe" from Turbo Debugger
71429 bytes downloaded
Download complete
Link broken
The Compaq automatically returns to DOS after finishing, and pressing Ctrl-Break on the
Beetle I will exit TDRemote. The communication ports that we currently use for these
downloads are COM1 on the Compaq, and COM1 on Beetle I channel A. The download
rate is 19,200 bits per second.
A.4 Distributing Files Amongst the Beetle Channels
The programs running on Beetle I differ slightly from channel to channel, due to the
variations in private keys. We download the files for all three channels to channel A
from the Compaq machine. Then we must copy the appropriate files to channels B and
C. Extending the previous example, we also copy the files chanb.exe and chanc.exe to
channel A. Then we copy chanb.exe to channel B, and chanc.exe to channel C. We
complete these transfers with the use of two utilities, filesend.exe and fileget.exe. The
following is an example of using these two programs:
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Beetle I, Channel A:
C:\> filesend chanb.exe
Send file (l)eft or (r)ight? r <-- user input required
Waiting for handshake
Beetle I, Channel B:
C:\> fileget chanb.exe
Get file from (l)eft or (r)ight? 1 <-- user input required
Sending handshake
Beetle I, Channel A:
Received handshake
Uploading file *** chanb.exe ***
Finished transmission
Beetle I, Channel B:
Downloading file *** chanb.exe ***
.......................... X .....X .......
71429 bytes received
Download complete, 2 corrected error(s)
These utilities transfer files in blocks of 1024 bytes, and verifies the accuracy of the
transmission using a 16-bit checksum. If a block becomes corrupted in transmission, it is
immediately retransmitted. Each time filesend transmits a block of information, and each
time fileget receives a verified block, these utilities echo a period to the screen. When
fileget receives a corrupted block, it echoes an "X" to the screen.
A.5 Executing the Beetle Code
Once we have copied the files to the appropriate channels, we must start the programs
running. We accomplish this by simply entering chana, chanb, and chanc, at the DOS
prompts on channels A through C, respectively. The initial synchronization then occurs,
and an FDI display appears on each screen. Currently, synchronizations and votes each
occur once every ten seconds.
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Appendix B: 32-bit Modular Inverses
Number Private Key (P) Public Key (P-')
1. 1 lela32f 59b483cf
2. 17d7841d 212b5e35
3. ldcd6509 3e79b939
4. 47868c27 7bf62397
5. 6553flOb 300852a3
6. ef78ed79 29b2ecc9
7. 18bde641 63b529cl
8. fe80cfe7 1fl ad3d7
9. fc8e2fe9 48c79859
10. dbl47bcl 2c819441
11. ef6066d9 585bb969
12. e6924c91 2252f471
13. flO09aecl 59b3e141
14. c7e05b9b 51179293
15. 65288b31 fb2aeddl
16. 47297df9 d358b449
17. 196cad4d 22c25385
18. 478ce29d 17bOb3b5
19. 79flbcll e212b4fl
20. 3a43d6fl 72ce5al 1
21. lb2fcbeb d03804c3
22. 56d91481 14ab2b81
23. 16e811c9 e9ded879
24. da3eab9b 7b68c293
25. 76887243 326dea6b
26. 381405e5 c8c3afed
27. 20ec05ef 31adc90f
28. c7aefO41 64c51fcl
29. f4294ded 7bal 17e5
30. f6bba44b 196e0563
Table B.1: 32-bit Modular Inverses.
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